Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 B. Page 23 Creating Space for Civil Society Limiting the influence of armed groups is also vital in enabling civilian leaders to emerge from among the refugees in Bangladesh. No such personage will rise to prominence so long as militants remain the dominant force in the refugee camps; armed group leaders and their associates cannot adequately represent the community as they are not accepted by many Rohingya, let alone the Arakan Army or foreign actors. Bangladesh needs to create an environment in which community members of all genders feel safe enough to take on leadership roles. Without such legitimate representatives, voluntary repatriation is unlikely to occur, as there will be few Rohingya leaders who can negotiate and build trust with the Arakan Army. For civilian leadership to emerge, the Bangladeshi government needs to review its own policies regarding management of the refugee camps. Since the August 2019 genocide day rallies, which prompted a domestic backlash, Bangladeshi authorities have kept Rohingya civil society figures under close watch and limited their ability to organise. At times, they have sought to displace the civil society groups that emerged organically since 2017 by sponsoring rival organisations that advocate for repatriation or other causes that align with Bangladeshi interests. These groups lack credibility with refugees, who perceive them as government stooges. Bangladesh should allow greater political space within the camps so that genuinely representative figures can emerge. C. Inclusive Government in Rakhine The Arakan Army’s next steps will be crucial. Regardless of the hostility it has faced from the Myanmar military and Rohingya armed groups, its troops’ actions in northern Rakhine, along with public statements from its leaders, have badly damaged the group’s reputation in the refugee camps, and Rohingya armed groups are capitalising on this sentiment. Further abuses of civilians in northern Rakhine as part of clearance operations targeting Rohingya armed groups will only add fuel to the insurgency, creating a cycle of violence and fear that is likely to force more Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh. Additional refugee flight will hurt the Arakan Army’s relationship with Dhaka, undermine prospects for developing its proto-state and likely prompt more Rohingya to join armed groups. The Arakan Army needs to show that it can govern for all communities in Rakhine State, including the Rohingya Muslim minority. Despite apparent attempts at including Rohingya in the lower echelons of its expanding administration, many Rohingya civilians still complain that life is hardly better than under the military. The Arakan Army should end discrimination against Rohingya civilians, build trust with community leaders and ensure that they have equal access to services and livelihood opportunities. As a refugee put it: “They are the ones who can bring peace and justice by ruling fairly. If they are good and just, the situation will get much better”.114 To show such fairness, however, the Arakan Army will itself need to be convinced that Rohingya armed groups are ceasing operations in Rakhine and relations with Dhaka are on a more stable footing. 114 Crisis Group interview, Rohingya refugee living outside the camps, March 2025.