Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 13 Bangladeshi officials and foreign policy experts insist there is no formal support for Rohingya armed groups. “The policy remains the same – there is no way we will provide support”, said one senior official. “Yunus knows it would just create a lot of trouble. ... Would anyone defy his orders? Nobody will get involved in this stupidity”.79 That said, a former senior Bangladeshi diplomat told Crisis Group that some were taking advantage of a “policy vacuum” to support Rohingya armed groups. “These things happen at the local level”, he said. “I’m 200 per cent sure it’s not official policy”.80 C. The Impact of Funding Cuts Until recently, funding for the Rohingya refugee humanitarian response had proven resilient. Since 2017, the annual appeals issued by the UN and the Bangladeshi government have typically received 70-75 per cent of the targeted amount – far higher than many other appeals – and pulled in close to $700 million per year. Over the last couple of years, however, competing crises have made it harder to attract funding; in 2024, commitments fell to $550 million (around 65 per cent of the target), and food assistance was temporarily reduced for several months.81 In response, Bangladesh has shifted its policies, slowly moving toward allowing aid organisations to start more projects aimed at alleviating a protracted refugee crisis, including providing more durable housing and opportunities to earn a living. Even so, refugees remain heavily reliant on foreign aid.82 U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to first freeze and eventually cut international assistance after taking office in late January has already had a dramatic impact in Cox’s Bazar, given that U.S. funding accounted for more than half of the humanitarian response.83 Everything from health care services and education to waste management has either stopped or been scaled back significantly, and the UN agencies and NGOs working in the camps have laid off many Rohingya “volunteers”, cutting a rare source of income for refugees.84 The Trump administration has also stopped all refugee settlement programs to the U.S., dashing the interim government’s hope that Washington might accept as many as 20,000 per year.85 79 Crisis Group interview, senior Bangladeshi official, May 2025. Crisis Group interview, former senior Bangladeshi diplomat, March 2025. 81 For detailed information, see the “Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan 2024” and previous years’ plans on the Financial Tracking Service website of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid. 82 While Rohingya are not legally allowed to work outside the camps, many find employment, particularly in agriculture, fishing and construction. Some families also receive remittances from relatives abroad. 83 In 2024, the U.S. contributed 55 per cent of all funding to the UN’s yearly appeal for the Rohingya refugee crisis. On the U.S. aid cuts, see Chris Newton and Delaney Simon, “U.S. Aid Cuts Make Famine More Likely and Easier to Hide”, Crisis Group Commentary, 28 February 2025. 84 The UN and other humanitarian groups are allowed to employ Rohingya as “volunteers”, paying them the equivalent of around $80 a month. Crisis Group interviews, humanitarian officials, March 2025. 85 Bangladesh had long opposed third-country resettlement, arguing that it would result in more refugees crossing the border, but allowed it to resume in 2022. Since then, the U.S. had resettled around 2,500 Rohingya refugees, while smaller numbers have gone to Canada, New Zealand and 80