Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 12 ed) its rival’s forced recruitment campaigns in April-May 2024.71 Speaking to Crisis Group, officials from the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the military intelligence agency, denied backing forced recruitment or even that it had taken place.72 But the scale of the recruitment was such that intelligence agencies would have been aware of it. At a minimum, their decision not to intervene suggests a level of tacit support, as does the fact that the RSO sent many of its members and recruits across the border during daylight hours.73 In the wake of the 8 November truce between the warring Rohingya armed groups, DGFI sought to claim credit for the agreement. Shortly afterward, officials from the body invited UN representatives to a meeting in Cox’s Bazar and introduced Dil Mohammed as “our negotiator” who brokered what they termed the “mission harmony” agreement.74 Other sources confirmed to Crisis Group that DGFI “orchestrated” the truce.75 The relative freedom with which Rohingya armed groups have subsequently been able to conduct recruitment campaigns suggests that DGFI and other agencies are supportive of these activities. At the 25 December unity rally, organisers thanked the authorities for permitting it to take place, with members of the Armed Police Battalion posted around the crowd; security personnel have also been present at some more recent meetings. Dil Mohammed’s supporters and affiliates of the armed groups have also been included in meetings or events with visiting dignitaries, such as Organisation for Islamic Cooperation envoy Ibrahim Khairat in February and UN Secretary-General António Guterres in March.76 Refugees Crisis Group spoke to believe that Rohingya armed groups are acting with the blessing of security agencies.77 Security officials have previously suggested to Crisis Group that Rohingya armed groups could play an important role in securing the refugees’ return to Rakhine. In May 2024, at the height of the forced recruitment campaign in the refugee camps, one said he believed the Arakan Army’s offensive presented “a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to resolve the Rohingya crisis”, because the community could get training and weapons from the Myanmar military. “Once more than 5,000 have received training from the military, it will be tough for the Arakan Army to crush their resistance. … Rohingyas have the ability to fight. They know the terrain. All they need is weapons to halt the Arakan Army”, he explained, adding that he believed Bangladesh should “help build [this] capacity” in order to carve out a Rohingya enclave in northern Rakhine by force.78 71 Crisis Group interviews, Bangladesh officials, September 2024. Crisis Group Report, Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State, op. cit. See also “Competing Armed Groups Pose New Threat to Rohingya in Bangladesh”, IISS, 11 December 2023. 72 Crisis Group interviews, DGFI officials, June and September 2024. 73 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya resident in Maungdaw, July 2024; Rohingya refugee, March 2025. 74 Crisis Group interview, individual with knowledge of the meeting, March 2025. 75 Crisis Group interview, sources with knowledge of the matter, February-March 2025. 76 “Dil Mohammed, the Rohingya camps and Dhaka’s diplomacy”, Rohingya Refugee News, 20 May 2025. 77 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees, February-March 2025. 78 Crisis Group interview, Bangladeshi security official who follows developments in Rakhine State closely, May 2024.