Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 7 III. A Rohingya Insurgency in the Making? The Arakan Army’s conquest of Maungdaw in December 2024 has initiated a new phase in northern Rakhine State’s conflict. Under pressure from Bangladeshi authorities, Rohingya armed groups have stopped fighting one another and boosted recruitment activities in the refugee camps. As refugees’ anger at the Arakan Army and despair over the lack of opportunities has grown, their support for armed struggle to carve out a Rohingya homeland has risen. One of the armed groups, ARSA, has already started carrying out attacks in northern Rakhine, initially targeting civilians and more recently Arakan Army fighters. Rohingya armed group activities on both sides of the border have undermined Dhaka’s efforts to engage with the Arakan Army, as the latter believes Bangladesh – and particularly the country’s security agencies – is conspiring with its adversaries. A. Harmony and Unity? In late 2024, with the fall of Maungdaw seemingly imminent, the four largest Rohingya armed groups began negotiations to pause the turf war that had engulfed Bangladesh’s refugee camps for more than two years.35 On 8 November, they reached an informal agreement, dubbed “mission harmony”, that amounts to a truce in the camps and a loose commitment to work together against the Arakan Army in Rakhine State.36 The deal was brokered by Dil Mohammed, a Rohingya businessman with longstanding links to the military and the regime’s Border Guard Police.37 While not formally affiliated with any armed group, he has since emerged as a leading political figure in the camps.38 The November agreement has led to a large reduction in violent incidents within the camps. After rising sharply through 2023 and 2024, killings linked to armed groups stopped almost completely for around four months, while reported violent incidents more than halved.39 All categories of violent crime have fallen except for abductions and kidnappings for ransom, which have increased markedly in recent months. By some estimates, around half of these cases are thought to be linked to the armed groups, in what appears to essentially be a fundraising drive.40 This welcome reduction in violence has come at a cost: it has enabled Dil Mohammed and armed groups to carry out open recruitment campaigns among refugees. To avoid the community opposition that the RSO faced when it attempted mass forced recruitment in May 2024, they have tried to mobilise refugees by convincing them of the need to retake northern Rakhine from the Arakan Army by force, claiming to 35 The four groups are the RSO, ARSA, the Arakan Rohingya Army and Rohingya Islamic Mahaz. “Joint Protection Monitoring Report”, Protection Sector, Quarter 4 2024. Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees and humanitarian agency officials, February 2025. 37 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees and humanitarian agency officials, February 2025. 38 Ibid. 39 According to a monitoring organisation, an average of 34 violent incidents and seven killings were reported monthly from January 2023 to October 2024. Starting in November 2024, the average has been fifteen incidents and two killings. 40 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees and humanitarian agency officials, February and March 2025. 36