April 2020] THE "WEAPONIZATION" OF FACEBOOK 841 too have demanded their companies uphold human rights efforts by organizing campaigns internally.227 A group of Google engineers began their own internal investigation into Project Dragonfly, Google’s censored search engine for China.228 In an open letter to Google, these employees objected to this project, opposing “technologies that aid the powerful in oppressing the vulnerable, wherever they may be.”229 This July, Google’s Vice President of Public Policy, Karan Bhatia, confirmed that Google abandoned work on Project Dragonfly.230 The growing concerns regarding the weaponization of Facebook reflect the need for social media corporations to commit to investigating human rights violations. While Facebook cannot be completely responsible for the part it played in human rights violations against the Rohingya, it nevertheless remains unaccountable for its slow and ineffective response. Facebook must begin incorporating support for human rights into its business strategy as suggested in the BSR Report.231 Notably, the BSR Report highlighted the role of local civil society organizations and stakeholders.232 While corporate criminal complicity places responsibility on companies, they can rely on third parties to both notify them of potential human rights abuses on a timely basis and can hire audit companies more proactively. Civil society organizations played a significant role in the Myanmar crisis by directly notifying Facebook about certain violations and misuse of its platform.233 So far, Facebook has made positive steps towards addressing human rights abuses on its platform by joining the Global Network Initiative,234 a “multi-stakeholder platform” comprised of technology companies, human rights organizations, academics, and investors.235 The company also conducts comprehensive audits through third party, civil society organizations. If the goal is to deter social media corporations from aiding and abetting human rights violations, these additional forms of responsibility may be effective in helping them avoid corporate criminal complicity. 227. See Coulman, supra note 224. 228. We Are Google Employees. Google Must Drop Dragonfly., MEDIUM (Nov. 27, 2019), https://medium.com/@googlersagainstdragonfly/we-are-google-employees-google-must-drop-dragonfly4c8a30c5e5eb. 229. Id. 230. Jeb Su, Confirmed: Google Terminated Project Dragonfly, Its Censored Chinese Search Engine, FORBES (July 19, 2019, 4:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2019/07/19/confirmed-googleterminated-project-dragonfly-its-censored-chinese-search-engine/#73aeac1b7e84. 231. See Warofka, supra note 178. 232. BUS. SOC. RESP., supra note 210, at 28–29. 233. See Stecklow, supra note 145. 234. Protecting and Advancing Freedom of Expression and Privacy in the ICT Sector, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 235. About GNI, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/about-gni/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).