838 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:813 Relatedly, digital researcher and analyst Raymond Serrato examined about 15,000 Facebook posts from supporters of the nationalist Ma Ba Tha group.206 Activity within the group spiked on August 24, 2017 and August 25, 2017 when the ARSA Rohingya militants attacked the military.207 Posts exploded in those two days, showing a 200% increase in interaction within the Ma Ba Tha’s Facebook group.208 Serrato believes that “Facebook definitely helped certain elements of society to determine the narrative of the conflict in Myanmar . . . . Although Facebook had been used in the past to spread hate speech and misinformation, it took on greater potency after the attacks.”209 Davis and Serrato’s research suggests that these militaristic posts formed an anti-Rohingya culture in Myanmar in anticipation of the August 2017 attack. While further research is required to confirm the extent to which the posts affected the military’s actions in August 2017, Facebook undeniably acted as “a means for those seeking to spread hate and cause harm, and posts have been linked to offline violence.”210 Without a doubt, Facebook took some action to address the promulgation of hate speech on its platform. Facebook, however, acted “too slow” and too late.211 By allowing inappropriate and hateful content to remain online, Facebook substantially promoted the Tatmadaw’s genocidal campaign against the Rohingya. Facebook devoted “scant resources to combat hate speech in Myanmar, a market it dominates and in which there have been regular outbreaks of ethnic violence.”212 Prior to entering a country with a history of human rights abuses,213 Facebook should have implemented safeguards, incorporated human rights into its Community Guidelines, and established proper procedure for flagging and reviewing content. As the “de facto Internet” of Myanmar, Facebook shaped the country’s narrative with regard to the Rohingya and its failure to implement proper procedures in anticipation of such misuse constitutes a “substantial act” to the Tatmadaw’s military operations in August 2017. Although Facebook cannot be held fully responsible for violating human rights in Myanmar, theoretically, it could be held criminally liable for its narrow involvement with the Tatmadaw military and nationalist groups weaponization of its platform. 206. Id. 207. Id. 208. Id. 209. Id. 210. BUS. SOC. RESP., HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT: FACEBOOK IN MYANMAR 24 (2018), https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/bsr-facebook-myanmar-hria_final.pdf. 211. Stecklow, supra note 145. 212. Id. 213. Myanmar (Burma) Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/myanmar/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).