GB.358/INS/17(Rev.1)
11
maintaining dialogue while encouraging concrete progress on the ground. 18 Also in August
2026, the ASEAN Chair issued a statement calling the ICRC’s visit to Aung San Suu Kyi a positive
step towards national reconciliation and inclusive dialogue. He expressed hope that the visit
would lead to regular access by her family, legal counsel, medical professionals and
humanitarian representatives, and urged the military authorities to expand access to
detainees for all individuals held since the February 2021 coup, while reiterating calls for their
full and unconditional release. 19 The Malaysian Prime Minister stated that, while Malaysia and
ASEAN were not prepared to recognize Myanmar’s new government, engagement with the
authorities was necessary to negotiate the return of Rohingya refugees and subsequent trade
relations. Myanmar agreed to receive an initial 5,000 refugees from Malaysia. 20
19.
In September 2026, following Malaysia’s announcement of the first phase of its voluntary
repatriation programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) warned that ongoing armed conflict and violence in Myanmar did not permit a safe,
dignified and sustainable voluntary return of refugees and stated that it was not involved in
the planned repatriation of Myanmar refugees. According to UNHCR data, Malaysia hosted
approximately 193,800 refugees from Myanmar as of February 2026, including Rohingya and
Chin. 21 On 30 September, after 1,476 people had been returned from Malaysia to Myanmar,
the UNHCR expressed concern and questioned the voluntary character of the repatriation,
noting that the returned individuals had been held in immigration detention. It urged Malaysia
to ensure that all returns are subject to robust safeguards, including individual assessments
and access to protection procedures, and recalled that, until conditions in Myanmar allowed
for safe, dignified and sustainable returns, States should continue to provide access to asylum
and uphold international protection obligations. 22
20.
Also in September 2026, at the opening of its 81st session, the UN General Assembly appointed
nine members of its Credentials Committee (Bahamas, Belgium, Benin, China, Jamaica, the
Russian Federation, Uganda, the United States of America and Vanuatu), which is expected to
consider credentials submitted for that session. Against this backdrop, competing efforts over
Myanmar’s representation at the United Nations had intensified. The military authorities
continued to press for the replacement of the current Ambassador, who had been appointed
by the civilian government before the February 2021 military takeover, on the grounds that he
had been dismissed from the civil service. 23 At the same time, the NUG, pro-democracy groups
and members of the Myanmar diaspora continue to advocate for the Ambassador to retain the
seat. 24
“Thai PM Urges ‘Calibrated Re-Engagement’ with Myanmar ahead of Meeting with Min Aung Hlaing”, Reuters, 4 August
2026.
18
ASEAN, “ASEAN Chair’s Statement on the Meeting of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi with a Delegate from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)”, 7 August 2026.
19
20
“Malaysia PM To Offer To Host Myanmar's Min Aung Hlaing In Deal For Rohingya Return”, Reuters, 16 September 2026.
“UNHCR says it has no role in Malaysia's planned repatriation of Myanmar refugees, warns country is still unsafe”, Reuters,
1 September 2026.
21
UNHCR, “UNHCR Concerned by Returns from Malaysia to Myanmar Amid Ongoing Conflict“, Press release, 30 September
2026.
22
Myanmar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the military authorities, “Statement regarding the Illegal Activities of Kyaw Moe
Tun, Former Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations”, 13 September 2026.
23
National Unity Government, “CRPH And NUG Issue Joint Statement To Mark Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's 81st Birthday”, News
Update, 4 July 2026.
24
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