C4: အစိ&းရသည် အမည်မသိ ဆက်သ ွယ်ေရး သိမဟ& & ့ တ် လnိ$ W ဝ.က်က&ဒအ ် သံး& ြပ$ေသာ လံ&ြခံ$သည့်စာပိ&စနစ် (encryption)အေပ4 ့ ၂ မ.တ် ကန်သ ် ားသလား။ (၀-၄ မ.တ)် ့ တ်ချက်များ ချမ.တထ C4: Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? (0–4 points) Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because the military banned VPNs, limiting anonymous communication online. Users’ ability to communicate anonymously has been further restricted by the military since the coup. In March 2021, daily directives banned the use of VPNs,276 though some orders barring VPN use emerged as early as February 4.277 The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) confirmed that multiple circumvention-tool websites were blocked at least once alongside their IP addresses in February 2021.278 Although the blocking limited some people’s ability to use circumvention tools, they continued to be used by the public. Civil society observers suggested that the impracticality of the VPN blocking was one of the reasons for the military’s shift toward listing approved sites and services rather than attempting to update blocking lists.279 Anonymity has also been limited by the government’s enforcement of SIM-card registration requirements,280 whereby subscribers must provide their name, citizenship identification document, birth date, address, nationality, and gender,281 and noncitizens must provide their passports. Some subscribers have reported being required by telecommunications companies to include further information beyond the bounds of the regulations, including their ethnicity.282 Mytel reported in February 2020 that only 30 percent of subscribers had registered.283 The MoTC announced that month that it had blocked over 6.5 million 2 unregistered SIM cards.284 The MoTC then ordered telecommunications providers to bar outgoing calls for millions of additional unregistered SIM cards, starting in April 2020.285 At the end of June 2020, the cards were reportedly deactivated, with the corresponding phone numbers deleted and subscriber money forfeited. In March 2019, the government asked mobile service providers to limit each user to two SIM cards in order to protect “personal and national security.”286 It is unclear how this is being implemented by providers. The government was working to establish biometric SIM-card registration prior to the coup. In November 2019, authorities released a tender to create a database that can store up to 70 million records of biometric data received from mobile-service registrations,287 and the tender was closed in June 2020.288 The government announced that month that it had requisitioned resources from the USF (see A2), which was intended to support mobile access for marginalized areas, to pay for the biometric database.289 The database would include fingerprints and facial-recognition information.290 It is unclear which company won the tender. The draft legal framework required to implement the plan, including data protection laws, had not been made public prior to the coup. There are no clear restrictions on encryption in law, although vague provisions in the Telecommunications Law and the Electronic Transactions Law could be interpreted to restrict the practice. Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတ်လပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိ4င်ငံ - Page 22