B5: သတင်းအချက်အ လက် အွန်လိ&ငး် အရင်းအြမစ်များကိ& အစိ&းရမ. သိမဟ& & ့ တ် အြခား 8သဇာ^ကီးေသာ ပ&ဂqိ$လ်/အဖွဲWအ စည်းများမ. ၁ မ.တ် B5: Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? (0–4 points) 1 [ိင & င ် ေ ံ ရးအကျိ$းစီးပွား တိး& ြမzင့်ရန် ထိန်းချ$ပ် ထားပါသလား သိမဟ& & ့ တ် ြခယ်လ.ယ်ထားပါသလား။ (၀-၄ မ.တ)် At the beginning of the coup, the military took control of all state-owned media and government communications channels. This entailed the capture of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages, including the Facebook page of the NLD.160 The military has since used these outlets to disseminate its propaganda and threats.161 Some of the Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, including those controlled by the Ministry of Information, have been suspended, either directly by the platforms or in response to user-generated reporting campaigns.162 The military has also instructed the private media to report on the coup in a more supportive manner, and punished outlets that continued to criticize the junta.163 The military has repeatedly threatened to revoke media outlets’ publishing licenses if they did not stop using Myanmar words that translate as “regime” and “junta.”164 A directive issued in February 2021 by the military-run Ministry of Information argued that the terms were inaccurate, as the junta’s governing body was “constitutionally formed by the military.” Editors and journalists with the Myanmar Times reported interference in their work as management banned terms like “coup,” requiring the use of “power transfer” instead.165 Most outlets continued their critical coverage, and the military had canceled the digital and print publishing licenses of seven large national outlets by June 2021, rendering them unlawful and leaving their staff at risk of arrest for unlawful association.166 The military and its affiliates spread manipulated information claiming electoral fraud following the November 2020 elections. Since the coup, the military has simultaneously warned against spreading rumors and faced numerous allegations that it promotes misinformation itself.167 Even before it seized power, the military’s messaging on certain issues, including on the Rohingya and other ethnic and religious minority groups, dominated the online landscape. These viewpoints had been presented on state-controlled broadcast media and fed into the public discourse on Facebook. The content was then amplified by users with military backgrounds or other promilitary accounts.168 Despite years of affirming its desire for media freedom, the NLD sought to retain control over state-owned media during its time in government,169 apparently to manage what information was publicly available.170 As a result, the NLD-led government and the military dominated the broadcasting sector and a significant portion of print media prior to the coup, including those outlets’ online presences, either directly through the Ministry of Information or via joint ventures with private companies.171 They claimed to use official Facebook pages—such as those of the Ministry of Information,172 the State Counsellor Office,173 and the Information Committee174—to provide the public with “unbiased” information and combat “fake” reports from international media, often citing coverage related to the Rohingya people. Major social media companies have attempted to limit the spread of manipulated information emanating from the military (see B3). YouTube removed some accounts run by the military and imposed limits on others for disseminating disinformation after the coup.175 In February 2021, Facebook banned the remaining military accounts on its main platform and on Instagram, including those of military-controlled media outlets and companies.176 Military officials were also found to manipulate content during previous coverage periods.177 The military regularly published inflammatory material on Facebook before being banned by the platform in 2018 (see B2).178 According to multiple sources, nearly 700 military officials had been involved in a systematic campaign of disinformation for five years, creating and managing fake Facebook accounts and pages, which were then used to share false, misleading, and inciting content. Organized troll accounts allegedly helped spread the content to reach more users.179 In 2019, Facebook banned a number of pages and accounts for engaging in “coordinated inauthentic behavior,” some Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတ်လပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိ4င်ငံ - Page 14