ISSUE: 2026 No. 47 ISSN 2335-6677 The misuse of AML/CFT regulations to target opponents and non-profits has significant consequences. One of the most notable examples was the conviction and execution of Ko Jimmy for a number of offences, including “raising money from abroad to fund terrorist activity” 39 and exchanging “US dollars for Myanmar currency several times to fund terrorist activities.” 40 Non-profits have also felt the effects. NGO staff have reported that they were reluctant to visit banks and use the state-controlled financial system for fear of “being monitored and potentially arrested.” 41 Other organisations and individuals report being monitored or “arrested for transferring funds.” 42 The regime has prohibited some non-profits without MoUs under the new associations law from making inbound transfers for activity costs – a significant hindrance for organisations. These stringent restrictions and surveillance steps contrast with approaches of past governments – evidencing their politicised nature under the current regime. Myanmar’s own National Risk Assessment (2018) stated that non-profits were “at the lowest level of money laundering risk.” 43 The assessment also noted that most armed groups “are not considered terrorist groups as they are in armed conflict with the government and do not target civilians.” 44 Myanmar’s 2018 evaluation noted that it has not “faced significant transnational terrorism or terrorism financing risks from either local groups, groups operating in neighbouring countries or transnational terror groups from other regions.” 45 The low risks raise doubts about the motivations and necessity of fervent post-coup AML/CFT regulations in these areas. Though the FATF has been critical of some regime actions, they have also made statements and recommendations that risk legitimising the regime’s AML/CFT abuses. The APGML rightly called out the “disproportionate sanctioning regime” of non-profits, which “affords the Myanmar regime with potentially far-reaching, and disproportionate, sanctioning and punitive measures for breaches related to the NPO law.” 46 These include prison sentences for representatives of non-profits that are not registered or operate after their registration has expired. However, other statements described the passage of the Registration of Associations Law as a “good first step” in CFT regulation. 47 FATF also criticised Myanmar for not having a “specific government department or organisation assigned to investigate NPOs” for financing terrorism. However, given the regime’s use of terrorism laws, the lack of greater investigative capacity is probably viewed as a positive by many stakeholders. CRIMINALISATION AND JUDICIAL CAPTURE Since the coup, military authorities have criminalised many activities and exerted significant control over the judiciary, raising doubts over FATF recommendations that depend on the established rule of law. The regime has brought politically motivated charges against many individuals and currently holds thousands of political prisoners. One NGO stated that Myanmar’s “judicial independence has effectively collapsed” due to new laws and legal reforms which allow criminal prosecution of human rights and political activists, lawyers, journalists and potentially members of the public. 48 These changes raise serious doubts about the concept of criminality in Myanmar – with major implications for AML/CFT. For example, the 2024 Follow-up Reports to Myanmar’s Mutual Evaluation reviews the adoption of fit and proper requirements for microfinance institutions, insurance companies and securities firms. It notes that Myanmar has adopted “comprehensive measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function, in a microfinance 7