International Crisis Group Asia Report N°314 18 May 2021 Executive Summary Since the 1 February coup d’état in Myanmar, the online space has become a parallel battlefield on which the country’s military and its opponents try to rally supporters, share information and control the narrative around events unfolding in the country. This virtual struggle has been vitally important to both sides. The scale of popular anger at the military, the regime’s lack of technological capacity and the policies of social media companies have made it difficult for the military, known as the Tatmadaw, to gain the upper hand. At first, the junta resorted to temporary internet cuts and filtering websites, but when these had little impact, it moved to broader shutdowns, leaving the vast majority of people in Myanmar disconnected. It appears to have no viable long-term strategy for controlling online space, and prolonged internet outages are likely while it struggles to consolidate power. Foreign governments and technology companies should endeavour to keep what is left of Myanmar’s internet as open and its users as safe as possible, while restricting sales of equipment and software that the military could use to oppress opponents. The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector was a signature achievement of Myanmar’s decade-long experiment with democracy. In the early 2010s, then President Thein Sein took the bold step of breaking the monopoly of the state telecoms firm by inviting foreign mobile operators to invest. His semi-civilian government lifted restrictions on websites, overhauled laws and allowed new international gateways connecting the country to the global internet. As a result, billions of dollars of investment flowed into the country and mobile phone penetration rose from just 10 per cent to more than 100 per cent (many users have more than one SIM card) in the space of a few years, with well over half the adult population online through mobile data. This digital revolution brought significant social and economic benefits but also new challenges, particularly in the form of disinformation and hate speech. The use of online platforms to whip up hatred of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State during the Tatmadaw’s campaign against them in 2017 is particularly notorious. While the coup has brought an abrupt end to much of this online freedom, the openness of the internet in Myanmar was under threat even prior to 1 February. Since the National League for Democracy (NLD) took office in 2016, authorities have turned to vaguely worded defamation laws to lock up government opponents and ordinary social media users alike. At the Tatmadaw’s request, the NLD government reintroduced filtering of websites and backed internet shutdowns in Rakhine State, where the military was waging war against a local insurgent group, the Arakan Army. Before it was deposed, the civilian government had also been drafting a Cyber Security Law requiring technology companies to keep user data onshore and hand it over to the authorities whenever requested. It was also taking steps to gain real-time access to user data from operators. After taking power, the Tatmadaw drastically ramped up online repression. It enacted legal amendments to gain access to user data and prosecute prominent opponents. It also issued daily notices to mobile operators and internet service providers to restrict access to certain websites and virtual private networks (VPNs) that can skirt