Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 21 It is not entirely clear who the military is trying to reach with such propaganda campaigns. Some sources suggested the main target may be its own base – military personnel and their families, supporters of the military-affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party, nationalist groups and civil servants – rather than the broader public, particularly as attitudes harden against the military and opportunities to convince a wider audience diminish.98 Growing concerns over troop morale may make it imperative that pro-military messaging continue to reach the rank and file. Regardless, the Facebook account removals appear to be a major source of frustration for the Tatmadaw, which seems eager to reach an audience beyond its – relatively small – base. When Deputy Minister for Information Brigadier-General Zaw Min Tun hosted the military regime’s second press conference since the coup on 11 March, numerous new Facebook pages were set up in order to livestream the event. Anti-military internet users were, however, prepared for this possibility, and coordinated in order to detect and report these pages to Facebook as the press conference was taking place so they could be removed immediately.99 “The military keeps trying to set up new accounts and new pages – it hasn’t given up on Facebook. It just goes to show how significant it is to their communications operation”, commented one civil society source.100 The military and pro-military groups often refer conspiratorially to the “Myanmar Facebook Team”. This term reflects an apparent misconception that a large number of Facebook employees is in-country working to undermine the Tatmadaw’s activities in collaboration with the NLD.101 The coup has undoubtedly forced Facebook to take a clear political position and choose between the military and its opponents. This progression began with the Rohingya crisis in 2017, after which Facebook received a barrage of criticism for its failure to police hate speech against the Muslim minority.102 It has since made significant changes in the way it monitors and addresses risks relating to the use of its platform, not only removing military accounts but also developing closer relationships with civil society groups and vastly increasing its capacity to monitor Myanmarlanguage content. Since the coup, the company has not only further limited the Tatmadaw’s ability to use its platform, but it has also verified the pages of the civil dis- 98 Crisis Group interviews, civil society member and social media researcher, March 2021. Crisis Group interview, civil society member, March 2021. URLs of some of the removed pages are on file with Crisis Group. 100 Crisis Group interview, civil society member, March 2021. 101 At the 23 March press conference, a journalist from a pro-military media organisation, the Myanmar National Post, asked Zaw Min Tun about the “Myanmar Facebook Team”, complaining that it was “supporting media that are publishing content inciting the riots, but at the same time our pages and government pages are at risk of being removed”. Zaw Min Tun replied that the regime was “conducting a detailed examination”, and that it plans to take unspecified legal action to address the issue. Also see, for example, “Facebook’s been obviously interfering in Myanmar’s election”, Radio Free Myanmar, 24 October 2020. Radio Free Myanmar is a Wordpress blog that spreads pro-military and anti-NLD disinformation by encouraging supporters in its network to screenshot and share articles on Facebook in order to get around moderation efforts. See “Radio Free Myanmar: Disinformation network spread false news and hate speech”, Frontier Myanmar, 9 October 2020, for more background. 102 “How Facebook’s rise fueled chaos and confusion in Myanmar”, op. cit. 99