20 | Country RISING REPRESSION MEETS GLOBAL RESISTANCE: INTERNET SHUTDOWNS IN 2025 Method of LEO satellite internet shutdown Syria The Syrian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology confiscated Starlink devices, impacting internet access for more than 5,000 people,106 claiming the devices violated citizens’ privacy, threatened the “national revenue” of the ministry, and “damaged […] the frequency spectrum of the Syrian Telecommunications.”107 The ministry also prohibited the use and possession of satellite internet devices without prior licensing from the telecommunications regulatory authority.108 Tanzania Authorities added LEO satellite internet within the scope of an existing full network shutdown order in late October 2025, according to reports from Access Now partners. Yemen In Houthi-controlled areas, authorities demanded residents immediately surrender109 any Starlink equipment, issuing threats of confiscation and penalties that they subsequently followed through with.110 The Houthis have opposed Starlink in its held areas as a national security threat since 2024.111 LEO satellite shutdowns increase in 2025 6 4 14 Depending on the tactic they used, perpetrators had various levels of success in keeping people offline. In many cases, the rationale was protecting national security, even though shutdowns cut off and endanger entire populations. Provided that there is proper governance and human rights guardrails,112 LEO satellite internet holds tremendous promise for connecting millions worldwide, especially those living in conflict zones.113 However, given the growing sophistication of jamming technology to curb its use,114 as we have seen in Iran in January 2026, it’s critical to ensure ongoing investment and support of the development of safe, secure systems for alternative connectivity, which are particularly crucial in times of crisis.115 106 SMEX (2025). Syria: authorities threaten social media users and confiscate Starlink devices. https://smex.org/syria-authorities-threatensocial-media-users-and-confiscate-starlink-devices/. 107 Syrian Arab News Agency (2025). The judicial police of the Ministry of Communications remove a number of violations in the Damascus countryside. https://sana.sy/governorates/reef-dimashak/2193873/. 108 Syrian Telecommunications and Postal Regulatory Authority (2025). A circular regarding the prohibition of possessing satellite communication stations without obtaining the necessary licenses. https://www.sytpra.gov.sy/pages/‫رابخألا‬/‫ميمعت‬-‫صوصخب‬-‫عنم‬-‫ةزايح‬-‫تاطحم‬-‫لاصتالا‬‫يئاضفلا‬-‫نود‬-‫لوصحلا‬-‫ىلع‬-‫صيخارتلا‬-‫ةمزاللا‬ 109 Saba Net (2026). The Ministry of Communications urges citizens and legal entities to hand over Starlink terminals and equipment. https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3472031.htm. 110 Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (2025). The Ministry of Communications is carrying out a field campaign to confiscate banned "Starlink" equipment. https://mtit.gov.ye/news_info.aspx?NID=461. 111 Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (2024). Communications: Allowing the "Starlink" company to provide internet services in the occupied areas by the mercenaries of the aggression is a blatant violation of Yemen's sovereignty. https://mtit.gov.ye/pdata_info.aspx?PDID=409. 112 Access Now (2025). Holding space for human rights: Improving the governance of satellite internet connectivity. https://www.accessnow.org/improving-satellite-internet-connectivity-governance 113 News Lines Magazine (2025). Sudanese people don’t have the luxury of hating Elon Musk. https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/sudanese-people-dont-have-the-luxury-of-hating-elon-musk/ 114 Filter Watch (2026). Starlink’s resilience despite interference while Iran moves toward a sustainable isolation via the NIN. https://filter.watch/english/2026/01/13/network-monitoring-january-2025-internet-repression-in-times-of-protest/. 115 Direct2cell.org (2026). DIRECT-TO-CELL SATELLITE INTERNET. https://www.direct2cell.org/