19 | RISING REPRESSION MEETS GLOBAL RESISTANCE: INTERNET SHUTDOWNS IN 2025 Alternative connectivity shutdowns Perpetrators shut down LEO satellite internet 14 times across seven countries (Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Myanmar, Syria, Tanzania, and Yemen) in 2025, compared to four shutdowns of the same type in 2024. This drastic increase reflects the growing popularity of LEO satellite internet in areas with low connectivity and ongoing shutdowns of terrestrial internet. Depending on the context in a particular country, including factors such as the scope of satellite device deployment and the legality of services like Starlink, authorities used a variety of tactics to prevent people from accessing the internet via satellite. Country Method of LEO satellite internet shutdown Chad Authorities in Chad shut down Starlink internet access for the Abu Tanqi and Maji refugee camps for three days by abruptly requiring permit fees that were not previously compulsory.99 Starlink was the only available internet service for the camps, so the shutdown further isolated people from communication and disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid.100 Equatorial Guinea Authorities have restricted access to the internet on the island province of Annobón since July 2024, while also making it difficult for anyone but the wealthy elite to get access to LEO satellite internet, due to exorbitant prices and select availability.101 Iran Following the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, Iranian authorities criminalized the purchase, sale, import, and use of unauthorized internet tools, such as Starlink, with harsh punishments ranging from imprisonment and device confiscation to possibly the death penalty102 if a violator used such tools with the intent to act against the regime, or for “spying.”103 Myanmar A set of six perpetrators imposed eight LEO satellite internet shutdowns in 2025, in seven states or administrative regions of Myanmar, through the closure of Starlink cafés, arrests of device owners, and confiscation of equipment.104 Resistance forces that carried out this type of shutdown reportedly did so “out of necessity for security,” in an attempt to stop information leaks regarding the junta’s airstrikes.105 99 Darfur Network for Human Rights (2025). Internet access restored in Chad’s refugee camps after financial fee dispute. https://dnhr.org/2025/01/22/internet-access-chad-refugee-camps-restoration/. 100 Ibid. 101 Diaro Rombe (2024). Censorship in Equatorial Guinea: conflict with Starlink and the crisis in Annobón. https://diariorombe.es/tecnologia/censura-en-guinea-ecuatorial-conflicto-con-starlink-y-la-crisis-en-annobon/. 102 Filter Watch (2025). Iran’s digital clampdown: “Corruption on Earth” and wartime internet control. https://filter.watch/english/2025/07/10/ network-and-policy-monitoring-june-2025-irans-response-death-penalty-for-satellite-internet-users-after-israeli-attack/. 103 Saeed Kamali (2025). The law to intensify the punishment of espionage and cooperation with the Zionist regime and hostile countries against national security and interests. https://nezamat.ir/‫نوناق‬-‫دیدشت‬-‫تازاجم‬-‫یسوساج‬-‫و‬-‫یراکمه‬-‫اب‬-‫ر‬/ 104 EngageMedia (2025). Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: May 2025 - July 2025. https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-2025-july-2025/. 105 Ibid.