Table 37: Key points for legislation on Network Shutdown to demonstrate a shutdown is necessary and proportionate             Network shutdowns impacting the entire country should not be authorised. A shutdown must only be invoked if there is a real and imminent threat to national security or a national emergency, and a request must specify the reason for the shutdown. These situations must be prescribed by law, including which bodies or agencies are authorised to make a network shutdown request. A shutdown request must be approved or authorised by the highest level of the government. There must be a clear request process, with limited actors allowed to make the request to operators, and a designated person in the operator to receive the request. The shutdown request to the network operators must be in writing. The request must specify the duration and geographical reach of the shutdown, and demonstrating direct material necessity. Shutdowns should be limited in duration and geographical area. Where possible, the public must be informed of the shutdown, the duration, geography and services affected. Each shutdown must be logged/recorded, and a list published annually. The public must have access to emergency services. The legislation must be subject to review, including a review of each shutdown by an independent oversight body. 253 The impact of network shutdowns on freedom of expression is so severe that Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression from the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the Representative on freedom of the media from the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have all concluded in a Joint Declaration that cutting off access to the Internet can never be justified under human rights law, including on national security grounds: “Cutting off access to the Internet, or parts of the Internet, for whole populations or segments of the public (shutting down the Internet) can never be justified, including on public order or national security grounds. The same applies to slow-downs imposed on the Internet or parts of the Internet.”254 In a second Joint Declaration, they concluded that shutting down entire parts of communications systems (mobile and Internet) during times of conflict can never be justified under human rights law. “…using communication ‘kill switches’ (i.e. shutting down entire parts of communications systems)… are measures that can never be justified under human rights law.” 255 253 See IHRB, “Corporate Responses to Mobile Network Shutdowns. Case Study Telenor Pakistan” (forthcoming). 254 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (2011), Article 6b. 255 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situation (2015) Article 4c CHAPTER 4.1: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 129 4 4.1