9/22/26, 11:13 AM Myanmar Telecom Risk, Part 1 of 4: Surveillance and the Law subscriber data, traffic, and staff communications by asking the operator for them. This assessment is the first of four in the series. Part 2 covers VPN restrictions and mandatory device registration, and Part 3 covers social media and practical security guidance. Part 4 compares Myanmar with other countries and with the data collection practices of the large technology platforms. Interception at the Operator The interception capability predates the takeover by several months. In late 2020, the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Ministry of Home Affairs pressured all four mobile operators to install lawful intercept equipment. This equipment allows the security services to listen to calls, read messages, and track a subscriber's location without going through the operator each time.2 The Israeli firm Cognyte won the tender for the interception gateway at state-owned MPT in December 2020.3 Telenor had installed a gateway made by Utimaco of Germany but said it never activated it. In September 2021, it cited pressure to activate the equipment as a main reason for leaving.4 When the sale closed in 2022, the gateway passed to military-linked Shwe Byain Phyu, which now operates the network as ATOM, along with call records for more than 18 million subscribers.5 Ooredoo agreed to its own sale in September 2022 and completed the exit in May 2024. That network now trades as U9.6 Mytel is a joint venture between the military and Viettel of Vietnam. With those two departures, no independent foreign operator is left in the market.7 Filtering at the Gateway The filtering system was supplied from China. Documents leaked in September 2025 show that Geedge Networks, a company linked to the designer of China's Great Firewall, sold Myanmar its Tiangou Secure Gateway. Trials ran from June to November 2022, and the rollout was completed by July 2024. The equipment is installed in 26 data centers belonging to 13 operators and internet service providers, and it is operated from command centers in Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. It copies traffic for inspection and blocks more than 1,000 applications based on their behavior on the network. It can also locate a subscriber in real time by matching activity to a cell identifier.8,9 Justice For Myanmar lists the hosts as the four mobile operators, along with Frontiir, Campana, StreamNet, China Unicom (Myanmar), Golden TMH, MBT, MTN, Global Technology Group, and IMNet.8 Because the contract provides for Geedge engineers on site and monthly updates, we expect the system's performance to continue improving. Cameras and Checkpoints Chinese suppliers also provide camera networks. In December 2020, 335 Huawei cameras with facial and license plate recognition began operating in Nay Pyi Taw as part of the Safe City project. Huawei says it supplied standard infrastructure equipment and did not supply the recognition technology.10 Our assessment, The Security Systems Watching You, examines the exposure that Chinese-made security equipment creates for companies.11 Dahua and Hikvision systems followed https://www.search-risk.com/insights/myanmar-telecom-risk-part-1-4-surveillance-and-law 2/9