4.2.1 Self-censorship Stop and search has become commonplace, with both police and military personnel setting up ad hoc ‘checkpoints’ across the country anywhere from streets to shopping centers. Raids are also regularly conducted, during which electronic devices are searched, seized and at times confiscated. If anything is found that indicates support for protests or the CDM, arrests are made, effectively signaling to others that their personal devices are no longer personal and that what they save, what they share and what they say online can and will be used against them. “Most of my friends are getting caught because they protested in the last months and were caught on the street randomly because they hadn’t deleted things on their phones.” (FGD_05) With the fear of arrest, youth have turned to selfcensorship, regularly deleting any incriminating photos or messages, and in some cases limiting their expression altogether. A respondent expressed that currently, keeping a low profile is a safety measure which is more important than expressing one’s own beliefs. (KII_02) Another way to mitigate risks has been to express views under guise, and youth often set up alternate social media accounts that they carry on their ‘outside phones’, second devices purchased following the coup that they would keep ‘clean’ and take outside. “You can’t tell soldiers you don’t have Facebook, so I just made a second account. Now I just take my phone out without battery, so they can’t switch it on. Or I use an old phone that doesn’t work properly I usually uninstall Instagram or twitter, but Facebook I keep so its believable, it’s the main social media they will check.” (FGD_06) 22 4.2.2 Rakhine State Respondents living in Rakhine state (various locations) shared a slightly different experience, however. Citing that in areas under the control of the Arakan Army - believed to be over three quarters of the state (Myanmar Now, 2021) - things remain to an extent, unchanged, though increased attention, and tension within communities about who is posting what online has been noted. Respondents also included various accounts of digital repression prior to the military coup with regards to the internet shutdown. All participants expressed a strong correlation between lack of internet and loss of FoE. In addition to the effects of the internet shutdown, participants also relayed experiences of repression linked to protest activity and talking about politics online. “In 2019, I expressed my feelings and thoughts regarding Human Rights abuses of people in Rakhine state, and I posted them online on Facebook. Between 2019-2020, three military soldiers came to our village, and they interrogated me and since then I feel that my Facebook is being monitored and watched. After the coup, when the military started arresting people that were outspoken about the coup, my name was on the top of the list” (FGD_03) (Female) Participants expressed a heightened sense of fear of being ‘cut off’ from connectivity (internet), ‘left behind’ and denied of information. “We don’t know if the internet will be shut down tomorrow or the day after tomorrow […] when they shut down the internet, we can’t do anything, and we don’t have anything anymore. We have lost those rights in the past, [...] we may lose those rights again because of the situation going on. [...] I don’t feel like a human anymore. When communication is shut down, we cannot access information from other places, or updates on the law, and we will be left behind.” (FGD_03) (Male) This heightened sense of fear, while peculiar to the people of Rakhine due to the years of repression, militarization and internet blockade, is currently widely shared across all states and regions in Myanmar. In this time of political crisis, the internet has become a symbol of resistance in Myanmar and people are also taking their resistance online via the internet. More importantly, the Internet has been instrumental in decentralizing and mobilizing the protest across the country. The continuous targeting of the internet by SAC means people might be deprived of the very tool they rely on to demand the restoration of democracy. 4.2.3 Information and communications technology infrastructure and systems (ICT) In the years preceding the coup, the military maintained significant control over government spending, particularly in the purview of security, defense, and law enforcement. They enabled the purchase of advanced ‘dual-use’ surveillance technologies as part of a modernization of law enforcement agencies. Review of government budgets allegedly display tens of millions of dollars earmarked for technologies that can mine phones and computers, recover deleted data, track live locations, and listen in on conversations. These ‘digital weapons’ are being used to track opponents of the coup (Beech, 2021). In the months preceding the coup, Myanmar’s telecommunications and internet service providers were ordered to install intercept spyware, that would enable the listening in