This is mainly because in pre-coup Myanmar, civic space was already shrinking, and intolerance towards FoE was growing, particularly towards media. All participants, however, agreed that things had ‘changed significantly’ and that while it may not have been entirely free before, now it is worse, coupled with raids and violence as a result of online activity. Online activities now can attract raids in houses, detention, maiming and even killing. (FGD_05) (Female) (FGD_07) (Male) Participants from Rakhine state repeatedly pointed to internet shutdowns in Rakhine state - the longest government-enforced internet shutdowns in the world (Human Rights Watch, 2020) – as a key factor in limiting FoE since 2019. In Rakhine, restriction in FoE is also associated with religion and ethnicity (FGD_05). In a post-coup Myanmar, a vast majority of the respondents (90%) felt that FoE was at an alltime low, while 83% also expressed that they feel free to express themselves online. One possible explanation for this is the extent to which respondents also pointed out that they had made personal digital security changes following the coup: 73%. This was further confirmed in FGDs as participants discussed their use of applications such as Signal and Telegram, or the use of paid VPN’s when accessing the internet. Adapting to increased restrictions through digital security measures online may have enabled respondents to continue to express themselves. 35 34% 36% 30 25 17% 20 15 3% 10 5 9% 0 5 4 3 2 1 1 = Free expression is severely restricted 5 = People have the right to express themsel freely 77% 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2% 2% 5 4 5% 3 13% 2 1 1 = Free expression is severely restricted 5 = People have the right to express themsel freely 4.2 DIGITAL REPRESSION: SAC INTERNET CONTROL In the first few hours following the military coup, the first of many internet shutdowns occurred countrywide, followed by the subsequent blocking of Facebook, Twitter and Instagram by the Ministry of Transport and Communication. To date, these websites remain accessible only using a VPN (Frontier Myanmar, 2021). Telecommunications providers have been repeatedly instructed by the junta to suspend Figure 2: Survey responses regarding perceptions on FoE prior to (top) and following (below) the coup. mobile internet and Wi-Fi services. Internet access is limited, unstable and unsafe. Myanmar’s SAC has also dictated key revisions of existing laws aimed at restricting mobilization and momentum of online resistance which is a direct violation of the right to privacy and allow for arbitrary arrests and detention. When asked what they considered the biggest threat to FoE, the most common response by research participants was that of government control—this refers to the surveillance and punishment by the SAC which has claimed all legislative, executive, and judicial authority. A strong sense of insecurity as a result of SAC oppression also exists among respondents. “The biggest threat is getting arrested, nothing other than that.” (FGD_06) (Male) 21