Person scrutinisation and monitoring system In March 2024, the military deployed a nationwide Person Scrutinisation and Monitoring System (PSMS). Installed on computers at checkpoints, hotels, and other public venues, PSMS integrates artificial intelligence with digital ID cards and facial‐recognition software. The military has claimed that between 7 March and 21 May 2025, PSMS flagged 1,657 “fugitives” whose images matched the system’s database, leading to their arrests by police. PSMS can identify individuals from facial images alone and is continuously updated to include former political prisoners released under amnesties. There are conflicting reports that PSMS was developed with Russian support and is powered by China’s Huawei. This new layer of AI‐enabled biometric surveillance further entrenches the military’s capacity to conduct arbitrary detentions and deepens discrimination against ethnic and political minorities by automating “wanted” lists. Discriminatory data collection and processing The military-controlled State and private actors in Myanmar harvest and utilise personal data in ways that can single out marginalised communities. These practices have deprived specific groups of their privacy, exacerbating existing social divisions. SIM registration and metadata sharing In March 2022, the military mandated that all mobile users re‐register SIM cards with accurate National Registration Card (NRC) numbers, full legal names, residential addresses, and facial photographs. This directive applied to every telecom operator in the country—Telenor, MPT, Mytel, and others—and required in‐person verification or digital uploads of identity documents. People were told the measure aimed to curb fraud, but it was clear that the military intended to tie people to their digital identities so that the military could conduct mass surveillance of the population. The measure would also increase fear and lead to increased self-censorship and a chilling effect on people’s free use of digital technologies. Some of the data collected by telecoms operators is deeply personal, and collecting it is unnecessary to prevent fraud. Rather, it would enable the potential to discriminate. For example, people were required to provide operators with information about their protected characteristics. In practice, the measure also disproportionately excluded people without NRC cards from buying SIM cards and accessing the digital space, including Rohingya Muslims and other stateless groups. As thousands of Rohingya discovered their SIM cards deactivated overnight in Rakhine State, they lost the ability to communicate with each other or access information such as on education and health, isolating them physically and digitally. Compounding this exclusion, telecom operators are forced to hand over call logs, text metadata, and real‐time geolocation data to military intelligence. Millions of people saw their personal