Impact on Internet Freedoms 3. Impact on Internet Freedoms Since the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and internet from November 2010 onwards under General Thein Sein, the elected NLD government, driven and orchestrated by the military behind the scenes from the early stages, took steps to control infrastructure and censor any digital content nonconducive to the military’s agenda of power preservation. Pre-coup, these steps included the blocking of outspoken media outlets, including provincial internet shutdowns in Rakhine and Chin states. Post-coup, the strategies utilised have become bolder; any sites hosting critical dialogue and almost all independent news outlets have had their access blocked domestically. National internet shutdowns have been enacted, destruction of internet infrastructure carried out, and systematic harassment and persecution of dissenting social media users has been conducted by Tatmadaw personnel online. 3a. Infrastructure Figure 1: Internet Infrastructure Network in Myanmar A primary feature of the Myanmar telecommunications sector is the prevalence of state-controlled companies. MyTel’s entry to the market in 2017 raised eyebrows among human rights advocates as an attempt by the Tatmadaw to reassert its dominance in the economy through the military-controlled business venture Myanmar Economic Corporate (MEC). The lack of transparency of the MEC and its business transactions was worsened by its partnership with Viettel, which is a state-owned enterprise of Vietnam’s Ministry of Defence. In February 2020, Facebook removed fake accounts and pages disseminating disinformation promoting MyTel. Internet shutdowns and service disruptions are nothing new in Myanmar. Through legal measures such as the Telecommunications Law, the government can effortlessly order content removal, terminate access, or simply criminalise the act of accessing certain information. MyTel is owned conjointly by the Tatmadaw, allowing for direct control by the military. Source: ITU.int MPT is under the supervision of the Ministry of Post and Communications. As such, these two companies have been more inclined to impose the military’s sanctions. From June 2019 to February 2021, internet shutdowns have been imposed and re-imposed in Rakhine State and some parts of Chin State, due to ongoing ethnic conflicts. With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, at the suggestion of the military and the military-backed Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), the government blocked local ethnic news media, a number of independent and regional news outlets and at least 221 websites, claiming that they were ‘fake news’ or had links with terrorist groups (Hlaing Lin, 2020). Local telecom operators were informed to stop the provision of mobile and fixed line data services during the height of the early post-coup protests and even block phone numbers of activists (Yuda, 2021; Potkin & Mcpherson, 2021). The termination of access or blocking of online content has been a tool used to establish control over domestic telecommunications infrastructure by the state, especially during the 2021 military coup to continue exerting control over the population. 13