documents reveal how these algorithmic features – including virality, the News Feed, Recommendations, and Groups – all promote and amplify divisive, harmful, and inflammatory content. Nowhere have the consequences of these content-shaping algorithms been more devastating than in the case of the Rohingya. 6.3 HOW META’S ALGORITHMS FUELED ANTI-ROHINGYA VIOLENCE IN MYANMAR The revelations contained in the Facebook Papers enable a renewed understanding of the manner in which Meta’s content-shaping algorithms fuelled the mass violence perpetrated against the Rohingya. In this section, the role of Meta’s core content-shaping algorithms is considered in the context of the 2017 atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingya in Northern Rakhine State. As has been outlined in Section 5.2, above, viral Facebook posts containing dehumanizing narratives and advocacy of hatred that incited violence and discrimination against the Rohingya were a dominant feature of the persecution of the Rohingya before and during the 2017 crisis. They helped to normalize the dehumanization of an entire ethnic group in the most violent, hateful terms imaginable, and facilitated the rapid spread of anti-Rohingya ethnic hatred throughout the country. In the lead up to the 2017 atrocities, the virality of these posts made them appear ubiquitous on Burmeselanguage Facebook, creating a sense that everyone in Myanmar shared these views, helping to build a shared sense of urgency in finding a ‘solution’ to the “Bengali problem” 221 and ultimately building support for the military’s 2017 “clearance operations”. Michael, the international aid worker who lived in Myanmar from 2013- 2018, described a typical Facebook News Feed in Myanmar in 2017: “The vitriol against the Rohingya was unbelievable online – the amount of it, the violence of it. It was overwhelming. There was just so much. That spilled over into everyday life… The news feed in general [was significant] – seeing a mountain of hatred and disinformation being levelled [against the Rohingya], as a Burmese person seeing that, I mean, that’s all that was on people’s news feeds in Myanmar at the time. It reinforced the idea that these people were all terrorists not deserving of rights. This mountain of misinformation definitely contributed [to the outbreak of violence].” 222 Meta’s use of content-shaping algorithms to maximize engagement were not considered by the IIFFMM. According to Chris Sidoti, an expert member of the IIFFMM, the Mission had no information about how these algorithms functioned at the time.223 He added that his current view is that these algorithms “increase the direct liability of the platform providers for the content that is distributed, because they play a role in bringing inciting and inflammatory material to the users who are most susceptible to being influenced by it”.224 Despite not overtly looking into Meta’s content-shaping algorithms, the IIFFMM’s final report nonetheless noted “the high levels of engagement of the followers with the posts (commenting and sharing)”.225 Some of the most egregious posts advocating violence, discrimination, and genocide against the Rohingya which were documented by the IIFFMM were Facebook posts which went viral, garnering up to tens of thousands of interactions and shares on the platform. 226 There is evidence to suggest that Meta’s content-shaping algorithms were amplifying harmful content, including advocacy of hatred, in Myanmar as early as 2014. As noted in Section 5.4, after the Mandalay riots triggered the Myanmar authorities to temporarily block Facebook in 2014, Meta supported a civil society-led On 1 September 2017, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing stated in a public meeting with ethnic Rakhine leaders: “The Bengali problem was a long-standing one which has become an unfinished job”, Simon Lewis, Zeba Siddiqui, Clare Baldwin, Andrew R.C. Marshall, “Special report - The shock troops who expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar”, Reuters, 26 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukmyanmar-rohingya-battalions-specialre-idUKKBN1JM1YA 221 222 Amnesty International interview by video call with Michael (pseudonym), 28 March 2022. 223 Amnesty International Interview by video call with Chris Sidoti, 13 April 2022. 224 Amnesty International Interview by video call with Chris Sidoti, 13 April 2022. 225 IIFFMM, “Detailed findings”, para 1311. 226 IIFFMM, “Detailed findings”,, para. 1326. THE SOCIAL ATROCITY META AND THE RIGHT TO REMEDY FOR THE ROHINGYA Amnesty International 45