Victoire Rio The Role of Social Media in Fomenting Violence: Myanmar 9 hundred and ninety three pages, thirty two groups and two hundred and twenty six accounts as part of four successive coordinated inauthentic behaviour takedowns in 2018 and 2019. Pages impersonating real media and public figures are also widely believed to make up part of the military’s distribution channels. Influencers: In addition to managing overt and covert assets, both groups appear to have benefited from a network of external supporters, including prominent writers and singers, who further contributed to the amplification of their messaging and agenda. Leveraging of amplification Both groups also demonstrated strong marketing savvy, which enabled them to amplify their messages beyond their own networks: Significant capacity for content production: Large amounts of time and resources appear to have been dedicated to the production of content, with new content introduced daily. While some of the content explicitly advanced the groups’ agenda or was designed to manipulate popular opinion through the spread of rumours and disinformation, other content appeared to be intent on maximising attention and audience building. Memes, cartoons, blogs and videos, designed for virality, were regularly shared, showing a high level of understanding for the social media demand and high technical skills. Content from external creators, including regular Facebook users, was also widely repurposed, with little consideration for copyrights or credits. One of the most sophisticated endeavours from Ma Ba Tha included the production of a six-minute video re-enacting the rape and murder of Thi Dar Htwaye, the Rakhine woman whose death kickstarted the 2012 wave of violence in Rakhine state. According to the Myanmar Times, the video, which was first posted through Wirathu’s account in early 2016, generated over 8,000 shares and over 120,000 views before it was taken down for violating Facebook’s community standards. Particularly successful content (including this video) was regularly repurposed and reuploaded, generating additional reach every time. Use of viral engagement tactics: In addition to demonstrating capacity and skills for content production, both groups showed a keen understanding of the Facebook platform and viral engagement strategies. Tactics such as the use of clickbait headlines, explicit requests for likes and shares, or the tagging of multiple accounts on posts were regularly used by assets believed to belong to these groups’ networks. These strategies appear to have been used to maximise newsfeed distribution and boost content reach, as well as to build and maintain an engaged audience. Audience segmentation: Facebook’s page and group features were also used to develop and engage audiences, as well as enable tailored message distribution. Township level groups, for example, appear to have been used by both the military and Ma Ba Tha to support the targeting of hyper local communities.