Myanmar: Analysis of Draft Cyber Security Law which do not appear to be subject to any form of constraint apart from the one about the individual involved being “related” to an attack (although even this extends to anyone who is just “related with” that first person). This may be contrasted with human rights standards about police investigations, which subject them to important constraints of both a procedural nature (for example often requiring the prior approval of a judge) and a substantive nature (for example that there is a clear link between the investigation and gathering necessary evidence relating to a crime). Similarly unconstrained powers are placed in the hands of investigation teams. Section 47 authorises the State Administration Council to grant any person or organisation the power to conduct investigations under existing laws (this appears to be in addition to the investigation teams appointed by the Executive Committee pursuant to section 12). Section 49 does at least require these actors not to interfere with “the fundamental rights of the citizens”, but otherwise grants them very broad and again apparently entirely unconstrained powers, such as to prevent “issues that can harm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State” (section 49(a)), perform “acts of rule of law and public order” (section 49(c)) and investigate crimes (section 49(d)). Similarly, pursuant to sections 52 and 53, the “inspection body” can seize evidence to inspect it and submit it to the court, again apparently without any constraints. Pursuant to section 50, the Ministry, the Department (which is defined as the one serving as the secretariat of the Central and Executive Committees) or organisation it may authorise can “visit and check and oversee the site of any online service provision business” where this is considered to be necessary to protect either State security or just the “public interest”, whatever that may be deemed to cover. Section 51 is even more draconian, authorising the Ministry, where necessary, again in the “public interest”, to temporarily suspend the provision of any online service, temporarily control any device relating to the provision of online services or even permanently terminate an online service provision business. These are powers that should only be wielded by a court or potentially an independent regulator which is subject to judicial oversight, and according to strict and clear conditions, such as a serious breach of licence conditions or the law. The open-ended term “public interest” should never be grounds for exercising such intrusive powers as these. Section 72 also provides for sanctions to be imposed by the Department which range from a warning to a fine to temporary or permanent suspension of an online service or business licence. Here again, these sorts of powers should never be placed in the hands of executive actors although the conditions for imposing such sanctions are more clearly defined, namely a breach of sections 44 or 48 of the draft Law, relating to collaborating with Working Committees and investigators. The exercise of these powers is not even subject to an independent right of appeal. Pursuant to sections 76 and 77, anyone who is aggrieved by the exercise of these powers may appeal only to the (executive-controlled) Central Committee, the decisions of which “shall be conclusive and final”. The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy -4-