Myanmar: Analysis of Draft Cyber Security Law Fifth, the specific types of content that are proscribed should align with what international law protections for freedom of expression allow. An initial point here is that it is not legitimate to duplicate in a cyber-specific law content restrictions which already exist in laws of general application. Otherwise, most of the specific categories of prohibited speech in section 29 do not meet the standards established by international law. Section 29(a) calls for the banning of “expressions causing hate, disrupting the unity, stabilisation and peace”. At least the last three of these are far too vague and subjective to pass muster under international law as restrictions on freedom of expression. A minimum requirement here is that a prohibition must be sufficiently clear and precise to give advance warning to those who are subject to it to act in a way that avoids falling foul of the rules. Section 29(b) covers “misinformation and disinformation”. While superficially attractive, international law rules out generic bans on inaccurate information. There are various reasons for this, including the fact that everyone makes genuine mistakes and the often subjective nature of evaluating the accuracy of a statement. At the same time, international law does allow for bans on false information in specific circumstances, such as where it harms reputation (defamation law) or is present in sworn testimony before a court (perjury). No such condition is present in section 29(b). This provision is supplemented by section 64, which provides for up to three years’ imprisonment and/or a fine for anyone who creates misinformation or disinformation with the intent of “causing public panic, loss of trust or social division”. While this does include an intent requirement and link the crime of sharing inaccurate information to a result, that result is far too broad to render this prohibition legitimate. For example, a report that 45 people had died of COVID 19 in Myanmar might technically be inaccurate, if only 40 people had died, and might cause either panic or a loss of trust (say in government), and yet it would clearly be illegitimate to sanction such a report. Section 65 is very similar, albeit applying to the creation of a fake account, website or web portal, whatever fake might mean in this context. Section 29(e) is perhaps the most problematical of the section 29 sub-sections, covering any “written and verbal statement against any existing law”. This is simply not legitimate; the criticising of existing laws is not only a protected exercise of the right to freedom of expression but a key activity in any democracy which seeks to improve itself. It may be noted that were this Analysis about an existing as opposed to draft law, this provision would serve as grounds for blocking access to it. Section 68 provides for imprisonment, again for up to three years, and/or a fine, for sharing or disseminating “sexually explicit speech”. Whereas as the counterpart of this in section 29(c) is linked to Myanmar’s cultural norms, this is significantly wider, covering anything that is sexually explicit even if it falls within the range of accepted cultural communication. Furthermore, while section 29 is unclear as to its scope, the language here suggests that even private communications, say between married people, would be covered. On the other hand, Section 69, which covers child pornography, is appropriate in its scope. The problems with the provisions in sections 64, 65 and 68 are compounded by section 85, which provides that all of the offences in the draft Law are cognisable, meaning that the police The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy -8-