9/24/21, 8:39 PM The State of Internet Censorship in Myanmar | OONI The findings of this study present various limitations and do not necessarily reflect a comprehensive view of internet censorship in Myanmar. The first limitation is associated with the testing period. While OONI network measurements have been collected from Myanmar since 2012 and continue to be collected on the day of the publication of this report, this study only takes into account and analyzes network measurements that were collected between 25th October 2016 to 28th February 2017. This study is limited to this time frame because we aim to examine the most recent censorship events and because there was a significant increase in the collection of network measurements during this period, in comparison to previous months and years. As such, censorship events which may have occurred before and/or after the testing period are not examined as part of this study. Another limitation to this study is associated to the amount and types of URLs that were tested for censorship. As mentioned in the methodology section of this report (“Review of the Citizen Lab’s test list for Myanmar”), OONI’s Web Connectivity test was run to examine the accessibility of 822 URLs that are more relevant to the Myanmar context and of 1,105 internationally relevant sites. While a total of 1,927 URLs were tested for censorship as part of this study, we did not test all of the URLs on the internet, indicating the possibility that other websites not included in tests lists might have been blocked. Finally, while network measurements were collected from six different local vantage points in Myanmar, OONI’s software tests were not run consistently across all networks. Stable measurements were collected from certain vantage points throughout the testing period, but less stable measurements were also collected from a number of other vantage points following the launch of OONI’s mobile app on 9th February 2017. In other words, once OONI Probe became easier to install and run via its mobile version for Android and iOS, we received an increased amount of sporadic measurements from various new networks. Since tests were not always run consistently, our ability to evaluate whether censorship cases were persistent was limited. Conclusion Signs of TCP/IP and HTTP blocking pertaining to fives sites, including the sites of the U.S. embassy in Myanmar and of the Organization of American States (OAS), were detected as part of this study. It remains unclear though why those sites might be blocked. Overall, 1,927 URLs were tested for censorship. No block pages were detected that could confirm cases of internet censorship. Similarly, no middle boxes were detected as part of this study. Blue Coat software (some types of which can potentially be used for internet censorship and surveillance) was detected in Myanmar by OONI in late 2012. It’s unclear, however, if this was a countrywide deployment or if it was only used in the specific network that was tested. Two years later, the presence of Blue Coat software was not detected in the same network, indicating that it may have been removed. Our recent study, covering the same network plus five additional networks, does not show the presence of Blue Coat software in tested networks. WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and the Tor network appeared to be accessible across all six networks in Myanmar where OONI tests were run. Acknowledgements We thank the Open Technology Fund (OTF) and Access Now for funding this research. We also thank all the anonymous volunteers in Myanmar who have run and continue to run OONI Probe, thus making this research possible. https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/ 18/19