Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) Crime as Cognitive Constraint ultranationalist monks, military generals, local and national government officials, and politicians, including members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the political party of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. 57 These figures used Facebook to manipulate the narrative on the Rohingya in two ways: first, they used the platform to post or share hate speech to a broader audience; second, they maintained official Facebook pages and accounts that easily connected them with like-minded constituents. This rendered the platform an important aspect of political life in Myanmar. 58 Ashin Wirathu, a member of the MaBaTha (“Association for the Protection of Race and Religion” renamed “The Buddha Dhamma Charity Foundation” 59), was the most outspoken monk responsible for spreading hateful rhetoric. His aggressive lobbying led to the passage of the controversial Protection of Race and Religion Laws in 2015, which targeted Muslim cultural practices. 60 These laws disallow polygamous marriages, regulate the marriage of Buddhist women to non-Buddhist men, and require birth spacing for women from certain ethnic groups.61 Wirathu also used the derogatory word “Mout Kalar” to generally refer to Muslims, including Rohingya. 62 Even the late U Ko Ni, a prominent Muslim advisor to the NLD, 63 was a regular target of Wirathu’s vitriolic posts. 64 Wirathu referred to him as a “Mout Kalar MP” or “Mout Kalar Nga Ni,” and questioned his role as a Muslim in Myanmar politics.65 57. See Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 696. 58. See id. 59. Moe Moe, Ma Ba Tha Changes Name, Still Officially Illegal, THE IRRAWADDY (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/ma-batha-changes-name-still-officially-illegal.html; Htet Naing Zaw, Ma Ba Tha is a Necessity: Military, THE IRRAWADDY (June 19, 2019), https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ma-ba-tha-necessitymilitary.html. 60. Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, supra note 36, at 11. 61. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 600. For a concise account of MaBaTha’s prominence in Myanmar’s Buddhist-majority society, see id. at 10-11. For a brief description of the Race and Religion Laws, see id. at 11-13. See also Matthew Walton, What are Myanmar’s Buddhist Sunday Schools Teaching?, EAST ASIA FORUM (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/12/16/what-are-myanmarsbuddhist-sunday-schools-teaching/ (describing how MaBaTha, along with “different organisations have been creating networks of Buddhist Sunday schools in an attempt to instill Buddhist values in children”). 62. Detailed Findings of the FFM, supra note 7, ¶ 1312. 63. Id. 64. Id. 65. Id. 155