2012). The aim of the job was to show “support for the ruling regime.” Later the same year, an opposition candidate who ran in the 2012 parliamentary election faced a trolling campaign aimed at discrediting his candidacy on social media (Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections, 2012). By 2013, the BRSM created at least 430 pages and groups on VK, the most popular social media platform in Belarus that time. These groups and pages had an audience of at least 105,882 users (Herasimenka, 2013). In 2015 independent media confirmed the existence of the BRSM troll army based on evidence of coordinated activities (NN.by, 2015). Fourth, members of the police force use fake accounts to harass activists and discredit them. One of the first uses of fake accounts to defame political opponents and trick journalists was reported back in 2012 (Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections, 2012). Since 2017, the police have been engaging in misinformation activity to target most radical political activists such as anarchist organizations. Specifically, anarchist activists accused the police forces of polluting social media platforms with fake accounts to monitor their activities and, in some cases, to harass them. Anarchist groups reported at least fifty-four accounts and pages on Facebook, Telegram and VK that were used for this purpose (The Republican List of Rubbish Materials, 2020). Some of these accounts published pictures and other private information obtained by the police during raids that targeted anarchists and other radical activists. This strategy targeted high-profile activists within the community and spread disinformation about them (Viasna Human Rights Center, 2019). There are also signs of non-political misinformation that circulates in Belarus. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, 171 social media accounts that originated in Belarus shared at least 229 posts that contained misinformation about the influence of 5G technology on the spread of the virus (Baltic Internet Policy Initiative, 2020). Most of this information originated on the Russia-owned social media platform VK. Table 1: Organizational Form and Prevalence of Social Media Manipulation in Belarus Initial Government State-controlled Politicians Private Civil Society Citizens & Report Agencies media & Parties Contractors Organizations Influencers 2011 The police Belarus 1, ONT, CTV, NTVBelarus, SB Troll farms: the Evidence BSRM Found Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Strategies, Tools, and Techniques The prime sources of manipulative content on social media in Belarus are human-operated accounts. They cover social media platforms, websites, and messaging apps. There is little evidence of automated online programs in use. Social media disinformation in Belarus often originates from the accounts of state-controlled outlets and groups. State-controlled media harass political opposition and minority voices and deceive the public into believing this disinformation. Up to 77.27% of news content broadcasted by three leading state-controlled television channels—Belarus 1, ONT, CTV—in November 2019 contained signs of propaganda and manipulation (Media IQ, 2020). This content mostly covered domestic politics such as the parliamentary election. These statecontrolled outlets also try to present Belarus as the only stable country in the region, while framing its political system as the only credible one. Common narratives that mention foreign 43