contracts (Al-Fardan, 2012). Two Washington-based firms, Qorvis Communications and Sanitas International, were reportedly hired by Bahrain to communicate with Western media and place opinion pieces in major media outlets (Goodman, 2011). The Huffington Post reported that Qorvis Communications, Potomac Square Group, and Bell Pottinger had all been hired to improve the Bahraini government’s reputation at home and abroad (Halvorssen, 2011). Qorvis Communications was also discovered to have puppet accounts on Wikipedia, used to alter articles that did not portray their clients in a favourable light, including articles related to Bahrain (Morris, 2013). PR firms utilized bloggers posing as journalists on pro-government blogs, such as Bahrain Views and Bahrain Independent, as well as faking social media accounts and partisan op-eds (Nyst & Monaco, 2018). Olton, a UK-based intelligence and PR firm, allegedly received a US$250,000 contract from the Bahrain Economic Development Board in 2011 to “develop an electronic system to track international media” (Bahrain Watch, 2020). The Index on Censorship reports that Olton possessed software that was able to identify ‘ringleaders’ through social media, which it notes is particularly concerning as dozens of protesting students were dismissed from university based on evidence that was gathered through their Facebook profiles (Index on Censorship, 2012). Table 1: Organizational Form and Prevalence of Social Media Manipulation in Bahrain Initial Government Politicians Private Contractors Civil Society Citizens & Report Agencies & Parties Organizations Influencers 2011 Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of the Interior Cyber Crime Unit Qorvis Communications, Olton (Multiple PR firms – explicit role in COMPROP unknown) Evidence Found Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Strategies, Tools, and Techniques Trolling Trolls in Bahrain have been found to spread disinformation, distort perceptions of the opposition, exacerbate conflicts and discredit valid information (Freedom House, 2019). Notably, journalists and activists are frequently “targeted with vitriolic state-sponsored trolling campaigns” (Nyst & Monaco, 2018). Nabeel Rajab, former President of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, has been the recipient of “regular troll attacks on Twitter” which he believes are from government accounts (Dooley, 2011). This ‘army of trolls’ has allegedly been active since at least 2011, when hundreds of accounts emerged following the February protests. Al Jazeera reporter Gregg Carlstrom tweeted that “Bahrain has by far the hardest-working Twitter trolls of any country I’ve reported on”. There are thousands of anonymous accounts with few followers and profile photos signifying support for the regime, such as a photo of the royal family (Owen Jones, 2013). Most recently, Freedom House (2019) reported that Twitter accounts impersonating users in prison were active in August 2018 and interacted with opposition supporters. Brian Dooley, a human rights activist, has been the subject of continuous troll attacks for his work on Bahrain. Attacks are highly personalized, as illustrated in Figure 1, which includes 35