Indonesia Introduction Indonesia is the largest majority-Muslim country in the world, with a population of over 267 million, and ranked fifth in the world in terms of total internet users, behind only the US, India, and China, and Brazil. Indonesia is also one of the largest social media markets in the world (Clement, 2019). According to research by Data Reportal, there were over 160 million social media users in Indonesia in January 2020 (Kemp, 2020) With a penetration rate of over 88%, YouTube was found to be the most used social network in Indonesia. However, Facebook and WhatsApp are also very popular, with approximately 40% of Indonesians using WhatsApp (Green House 2019). Though the country has made significant democratic progress since the fall of its authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia still faces challenges that have been exacerbated by a wellestablished and sophisticated infrastructure of online manipulation. Such manipulation has been part of the country’s political landscape for at least a decade, but the buildup for the April 2019 General Elections presented evidence of an intricately advanced framework of actors, organizations, and cashflow. The elections between the incumbent president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and the former army general Prabowo Subianto, resulted in a second term for Widodo (Lipson, 2018). An Overview of Cyber Troop Activity in Indonesia Organizational Form Political fake news and coordinated manipulation of online content by the government and other political actors in Indonesia has been evident at least since the 2014 presidential elections (Freedom of the Net, 2019). In recent years political cyber troop activity in Indonesia has undergone changes and developments. Specifically, there has been a movement away from the control of cyber troop activity by political campaign teams towards the influence of professional independent contractors (Renaldi, 2018). According to Ross Tapsell, an expert on politics and media at Australia National University, it has become common for candidates in Southeast Asia to hire campaign strategists to handle their online campaigns, who in turn orchestrate an army of people to spread political content on social media. This makes it difficult to find direct links between this online activity and the candidates themselves. Both competitors in the 2019 elections regularly denied hiring contractors to propagate fake news. However, there has been an array of social media operations spreading propaganda online on behalf of both President Joko Widodo and his opponent Prabowo Subianto (Potkin & Da Costa 2019). A large volume of social media manipulation in Indonesia originates at the hands of “buzzer” groups, named after the online buzz they create. Buzzer groups are teams of individuals, sometime influencers, who are contracted to create a buzz around a particular topic or individual. Typically, each group is comprised of a team leader, who receives tasks and funds from clients and manages the team, and team members, who each operate numerous social media accounts on multiple platforms (Potkin & Da Costa, 2019). Evidence from one buzzer team reveals that members were employed in a “luxury house” in Jakarta and operated from several rooms. One room was charged with spreading positive content about their client, while another room focused solely on promoting negative content to smear their client’s rival (Lamb, 2018a). 187