Dean: Myanmar past—and likely to represent a tip of the iceberg—is well exemplified by the high profile allegations or proven cases of phone-tapping, with diplomats including the UN Special Envoy Mr Paulo Sergio Pinheiro having found listening devices (Aung 2004). In post-2011 Myanmar, the fast developing field of telecommunications taps this legacy to combine it with new technological opportunities for monitoring. The telecommunications market was opened when Norway’s Telenor and Qatar’s Ooredoo, after having won the bid from among 91 international companies, started their operations in 2014, liberalizing the communications network previously monopolized by the Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and tightly controlled by the state. Mobile smartphones have become the most popular communication devices in Myanmar. The growth in social media users, and notably of Facebook, presents one of the highest growth rates in the world. Facebook in Myanmar has been equated with internet, its penetration being about 86 per cent in internet user pool (Aung 2017). The government has chosen not to block internet content but monitor its use. This is evidenced in the increasing prosecution rate of users over Facebook or other social media posts, enabled by the 2013 Telecommunications Law—a showcase of how relevant legal framework but also the political context conducive to using legislation for prosecution, becomes crucial. According to the report by the mobile operator Telenor (2015), the Telecommunications Law gives the government ‟broad powers of interception on a number of broadly stated grounds, including when it is in the public interest, and when the security of the State or the rule of law is adversely affected. The Law also appears to provide for acquisition of communications data powers, though these are less clearly stated. There is no judicial approval or oversight of the use of these powers. There is a form of government approval required, but the Law does not state what this entails.” The Law’s much criticized Article 66(d), setting penalties for ‟(e)xtorting, coercing, restraining wrongfully, defaming, disturbing, causing undue influence or threatening to any person by using any Telecommunications Network” seems to have been written with the end users in mind, and not the telecommunication companies and the government, although created with the intention of regulating the fledgling telecommunications industry (Freeman 2017; Lun Min Mang 2016). Additionally, the Law’s Articles 40, 76, and 77 provide “powers of warrantless entry and emergency interception under broad circumstances not subject to prior judicial review,” with courts or other independent authorities prevented from reviewing surveillance of, or access to, subscriber information and communications (Article 19: 2017). Other laws most frequently used to arrest, detain, and incarcerate people include the Unlawful Associations Act, often applied to prosecute people with contacts to ethnic armed groups (that many people have); criminal defamation laws; the Electronic Transactions Law, which has been used to criminalize political activism on the internet with punishments for "any act detrimental to" state security, law and order, community peace and tranquillity, national solidarity, the national economy, or national culture, including "receiving or sending" related information (Freedom House 2017); the Peaceful Procession Act with extremely vague wording open to interpretation, such as, for example, the prohibition of “…spreading rumours or incorrect information”; or sections in Penal Code where “committing mischief” is an offence, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (2017). The Committee to Protect Journalists (2016) listed Myanmar as the ninth most censored country for 2015, just ahead of Cuba, with the monitoring of journalists by authorities being one of its measurements to gauge censorship. In short, the restrictions and political control still imposed on society, reinforced in many laws, provide ample scope for surveillance. According to Freedom House (2014), state surveillance abated after the political opening but intensified somewhat in 2013 due to religious unrest and the opposition-led constitutional reform movement, while the Telecommunications Law introduced further scope for abuse. ‟Activists are subjected to many forms of surveillance—including being followed; having their photo taken when attending events and meetings; midnight inspections in their offices and homes; and harassment of their family members, colleagues or friends” (Amnesty International 2015: 12-13). Midnight inspections Surveillance & Society 15(3/4) 501