Dean: Myanmar 1999: 121).3 Regardless of the persistence of various organizations of political party-based and ethnopolitical armed opposition since the establishment of Burma in 1948, the military regimes have resolutely prevented any of them, or their coalitions, from challenging their power since 1962. Opposition groups ‟...neither forced the military into dialogue nor helped to ease repression. They have, however, seriously undermined the legitimacy (international, traditional) of the military government, which might have accelerated the ‘transition to disciplined democracy’” (Bünte 2011: 22). Croissant and Kamerling (2013) view the cohesiveness and high professionalism of Myanmar’s armed forces as the key determinant in the reorganization of the country’s political system that culminated in the new constitution and elections. The Myanmar military itself uses the notion of ‟disciplined democracy” as the objective of its top-down orchestrated reforms, made public in 2003 as the ‟Roadmap to Discipline-flourishing Democracy.” This blueprint involved the reconvening of the National Convention to lay down principles for a new Constitution; its drafting and adoption through the national referendum; the holding of elections for legislative bodies; and the establishment of the government and other central organs. The constitution, elections, parliament and two consecutive civilian governments constitute tangible deliverables as spelled out in the blueprint that had faced opposition, boycott, criticism and derision, while the top-down political reorganization, restrictive conditions at the NC, the ‟undemocratic” constitution, the unfair and unfree referendum and 2011 elections were denounced both internationally and domestically. This military directed concatenation of developments, but especially the Constitution that emerged, further contribute to its exceptionalism. The Constitution gives the military complete authority over the Ministries of Home Affairs, Defence and Border Affairs, with article 20(b) enabling it to appoint the corresponding ministers. Importantly, with the General Administrative Department housed in the Ministry of Home Affairs, much of the direct administration of the state is military-controlled by law. The Constitution leaves a return to direct military rule open as a legal possibility. The most often quoted manifestation of military’s continuing power are the articles that reserve 25 per cent of parliamentary seats for the appointees from the Defence Services nominated by its Commander-in-Chief. The amendment of the constitution has been made near impossible as more than 75 per cent of the members of parliament must agree to it first, while the amendment of most sections of the constitution requires further approval by more than half of the population eligible to vote, in a nationwide referendum. Patel et al. (2014: 12), after examining 189 constitutions world-wide, conclude that Myanmar’s constitution is considerably “more inflexible and difficult to amend than any constitution in the world.” In no other countries can the military veto proposals in parliament, thus the Myanmar military’s veto capacity over the constitutional changes proposed by the elected members of the parliament “singles out Myanmar’s Constitution from all others in the world and is out of step with international constitutional standards,” and the tenets of democracy as they are internationally understood (Patel et al. 2014: 10).4 Thus many scholars and analysts agree that Myanmar’s transition is rather a “regime maintenance,” that is, an attempt to sustain authoritarianism by creating institutions that facilitate elite power-sharing, opposition co-optation, the institutionalisation of military dominance (Prager Nyein 2009; Bünte 2011; Croissant and Kamerling 2013) or a ‟partially civilianized form of Myanmar’s long-established authoritarian regime” (Huang 2016: 3; see also Farrelly and Win 2016). Based on the studies of new institutionalism within authoritarian states that emphasize the stabilizing functions of political institutions such as elections, 3 The military first ruled Burma during 1958-1960 as a Caretaker Government when the politically weakened Prime Minister U Nu transferred power to General Ne Win, temporarily, to restore order. In 1960, elections were held and the civilian government was voted back. The military seized power in a coup d'état in 1962. 4 The only other constitution that specifies the appointment of military personnel to parliament is in Uganda, while the number of military appointees to Ugandan parliament in 2014 was ten and thus not sufficient enough to veto constitutional amendments (Patel et al. 2014: 8). Surveillance & Society 15(3/4) 498