Christina Fink nication. By creating and disseminating images of adversaries through the mass media—and in Myanmar’s case, social media—a group can generate widespread support for the idea that such adversaries cannot remain.2 This article considers the reasons for the explosion of dangerous speech in Myanmar, the impacts it has had, and the actions needed to prevent further violence. A Communications and Information Revolution From 1962 to 2010, Myanmar was under authoritarian rule, during which the regime imposed tight restrictions on the media, cellphone access, and internet use to limit access to outside information and prevent antiregime organizing. After 2010, much changed. The new, semi-elected government was eager to reengage with the world and gain domestic legitimacy. The authorities ended prepublication censorship and passed laws allowing freedom of speech, association, and assembly, albeit with restrictions. They welcomed foreign telecommunications companies; and competition between cellular providers decreased the price of SIM cards from several hundred dollars to less than $2. Cheap 3G Chinese phones became widely available and by mid-2017, most people had access to a cellphone.3 Facebook use spread quickly, partly because phones typically come preloaded with Facebook and some mobile phone plans do not count time on Facebook toward the plan’s minutes. In addition, virtually every news source in Myanmar can now be accessed via Facebook. By 2018, there were an estimated 16 to 30 million Facebook accounts.4 Today, Facebook is the internet for most people in Myanmar, and it has had a transformative effect on their lives. It has provided them with newfound freedom to obtain information, express themselves, and connect with others. Yet it also has a darker side. Facebook posts featuring dangerous speech have become prevalent, contributing to rising anti-Muslim sentiment and tolerance for violence against Muslims. Ultranationalists’ Use of Facebook Since 2012, a Buddhist ultranationalist movement has emerged and gained momentum in part due to effective use of Facebook to create a virtual community linked by shared fears. The ultranationalists have had two distinct, but linked, targets: 1) the broader Muslim population living in urban and rural areas throughout the country, and 2) the Muslim Rohingya population concentrated in parts of Rakhine State. On Facebook and offline, ultranationalists have framed Muslims as posing both a personal threat and a threat to the Buddhist majority nation.5 They have made claims about high Muslim birthrates, increasing Muslim economic influence, and Muslim plans to take over the country. They argue Muslims are increasing 44