ASIAN ETHNICITY 15 Facebook and Messenger are also valuable for organizing anti-government demonstra­ tions in some covert ways. A Kayah respondent explained how Kayah youth took advantage of communication through Facebook and Messenger when they confronted the state government over plans to erect a statue of General Aung San, a nationalist leader who was assassinated during Myanmar’s move to independence from British rule and father of recently deposed civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, in a public space in the state capital Loikaw.68 They saw this as an insult by the party in power to the local ethnic communities because they were not consulted and because they preferred to have a statue that commemorated a local hero. The respondent said: The youth organized their activities by using different strategies and the state government prepared itself to block the demonstrations. They used Facebook to post photos and share information with media through Messenger when protests were about to launch. They soon developed a way of communication on Facebook to circumvent the government’s surveil­ lance. They put a specific color on Facebook and only mentioned the time and then they can identify a place to gather [for protest] based on the specific color posted on the Facebook. Not knowing where the meeting would be taking place, riot police only arrived late. Gaining access to popular ethnic leaders Most respondents said that Facebook served as a channel to observe actions and receive important messages from people they admire and regard as leaders. Seventeen out of 26 respondents said that while they were not in a situation where they could personally know their leaders or establish a close connection with them, Facebook allowed them to be ‘friends’ with those leaders on the platform or let them ‘follow’ Facebook pages of their leaders to get in touch with them virtually and follow their activities. Three types of leaders can be identified based on respondent feedback: (a) leaders with a military background, (b) leaders with a background in party politics, and (c) respected commu­ nity leaders. A majority of respondents identified leaders with military and/or political backgrounds as their leaders. Only four respondents, identified local leaders who were socially influential.69 While some respondents identified more than one leader, all respondents showed significant admiration and emotional attachment to those they identified. Every leader identified by all non-Bamar respondents shared the same ethnic identity with the respondents, except for one, a Danu respondent who identified a political leader from a different ethnic background. Seven out of 26 respondents said they had no person they considered as their leader.70 Respondents who identified leaders with military backgrounds said that the leaders they admired were those from ethnic armed organizations (some of which are considered illegal by the government), and therefore it was difficult to have formal contact with them. However, they received updates about their leaders, including their actions and response to a critical situation or involvement in peace negotiations, through Facebook either via news posted by mainstream local media pages or individuals who have close connections with those leaders. A Shan respondent in his 30s said: The leaders I trust more are General Ywat Sit, the leader of RCSS71, and U Khun Tun Oo, the Chair of SNLD [Shan National League for Democracy], a Shan political party.72 The information about SNLD is easier to receive, which is covered by news and media, both in