While the regime claimed 139 observers from seven countries had observed Phase 1, the regime was unusually ambiguous about who had observed all 3 phases.57 In a humiliating U-turn, the Indian government distanced itself from its delegation, stating they attended in their personal capacity only. 58 ASEAN refused to send an association delegation of election observers to Burma, stating that there needed to be a decrease in violence before any reasonable election could be held. However, after the final phase of polling, the ASEAN chair, the Philippine FM Theresa Lazaro, stated that ASEAN would not recognize the sham polls as of now. She said it would continue to not recognize the regime as the representative of Burma: “Yes, the answer is yes: We do not recognize the military administration.”59 Prognosis: What’s Next after the Sham Election ● Conflict will likely intensify as the junta uses its sham election to offload governance and focus on military campaigns, emboldened by recent recaptures. ● Any post-election ceasefire hopes are naive, as history shows the junta breaks agreements and China lacks leverage over most resistance groups. ● Forced conscription will persist as the junta desperately seeks hundreds of thousands to replenish its troops. ● The plague of scam centers and other transnational crime activities will continue to be a cash cow in the junta’s conflict economy – not a single party in the sham election mentioned scam centers in their campaigns. ● The junta may seek to strengthen itself by increasing its cooperation with other “gangster” regimes, such as Russia, Belarus, and Iran. Armed conflict is set to continue, even escalate; hope for a post-polling “ceasefire” is naive Under the baseline scenario, the junta will cede limited administrative functions to those elected/appointed through its sham election, freeing itself to concentrate fully on military campaigns. Its recent recapture of townships in northern Shan State and Mandalay Region—enabled by both Chinese pressure and its own forces—has fueled a dangerous confidence. The regime now believes that with a steady stream of forced conscripts, it can reclaim more lost territory. The USDP-led sham government might attempt to restart “peace talks” with a handful of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) or broker a limited “ceasefire” with groups like the KIA or Arakan Army (AA), using China’s pressure. However, China holds little to no leverage over other Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) or the PDF. Ongoing military cooperation has ensured the regime can continue its atrocities. The junta has provided custom-made 120mm mortar rounds to Russia for its war on Ukraine. 60 Russia and the junta have strengthened military cooperation, with 4 state visits to Moscow since 2021. 61 The junta’s increasingly cosy relationship with Belarus appears to be under Russian patronage. Additionally, “ghost ships” with suspected links to Iran are secretly supplying the regime with jet fuel for its deadly airstrikes. 62 57 BBC Burmese (27 Dec 2025) တရို တ်၊ ရို တရာ်းနွအ ဲ န ်ူ် ို့ ယ ်် ်းယတကာက် ်ွ်ဲ ယတစာင် ကူကည် ြူြို့ ််ိုယူတို့ ာက်တ လာ ို့ 58 The Wire via Mizzima (29 Dec 2025) စစ်တကာ်မရင်က အနဒယကို တ ွ ်းတကာက်ပဲတ ွ လို့လာသူအပဖစ် စာ င်းထို တ်ပပန်၊ တ ာ်းဝင်အဆငို့်အ တန်းမဟိုတ်ဟို အနဒယ ပပန်တချပ Irrawaddy (30 Jan 2026) ASEAN Does Not Recognize Myanmar Junta’s Election ‘As of Now’ 60 Militarnyi (26 Jul 2023) Russia received ammunition manufactured by Myanmar 61 RFA (3 Mar 2025) Myanmar’s military junta chief flies to Russia for meeting with Putin 62 Amnesty International (25 Jan 2026) Myanmar: Jet fuel used in deadly air strikes flowing in on ‘ghost ships’ with suspected l inks to Iran 59 12