Techniques and tactics
While there is some variation in the descriptions of the specific steps taken to implement IO, we’ve identified
a central sequence of practices across these sources that make up the “Digital Disinformation Playbook.”85
1) Targeting: Propagators of disinformation operations carry out intelligence collection on their target
audiences via open-source channels on the web and analysis gathered by digital advertising
agencies. This information is used to develop highly granular understanding of potentially receptive
demographics.86
2) Content creation: Operatives create and curate emotionally resonant or otherwise inciteful content
(audio/visual, text-based information) for weaponization. This includes building narratives based on:
Propaganda: an idea or narrative-which can be misleading, but true, that is intended to
influence
Misinformation: the spreading of unintentionally false information by individuals believing the
information to be true
Disinformation: the spreading of intentionally false information by individuals seeking to
manipulate others87
3) Dissemination: Narratives are systematically disseminated through multiple channels, fusing
together social and traditional media and offline contexts such as printed materials or public
rallies.88
4) Amplification: Propagated narratives (whether manipulated, misleading, fabricated or unverified)
are then amplified by the following:
Botnets: pieces of software designed to create content and interact on social media
platforms.89
Inauthentic accounts
Influencers: willing or unwilling individuals or public personas who command large numbers of
followers.
#hashtag hijacking: using an existing hashtag on social media for a different purpose than was
originally intended
Astroturfing: imitating grassroots actions using coordinated, inauthentic accounts90
85 See T.E. Nissen Framework – Svetoka, 11; Facebook “Information Operations,” 2016; Lucas and Pomeranzev, 6; Sarah Oh and Travis Adkins,
“Disinformation Toolkit” (InterAction: June 2018), 11; Giorgio Bertolin, “Digital Hydra: Security Implications of False Information Online,” (NATO
StratCom COE: May 2016), 8-9; Hossein Derakhshan and Claire Wardle, “Information Disorder: Definitions” in Understanding and Addressing the
Disinformation Ecosystem (Annenberg School of Communication: 2017); Livingston, “Contentious Narratives” 2018; CRS 9-10; Lucas and Pomeranzev,
“Winning the information War” 2018.
86 User signatures and inferential metadata from social media can be pieced together to create profiles on behavior, transactions and interactions,
movements, personal details and preferences, and personal relationships and networks of any individual or group that might be targeted for disinformation
campaigns.
87 Disinformation includes deliberately false news stories, manufactured protests, doctored content (such as photos or videos), and tampering with private
communications before release.
88 While mixed media information campaigns use multiple social media channels and website-based platforms to perpetuate and amplify the reach of a
single narrative, cross-media campaigns leverage a central channel around which the campaign is built and hyperlinked to. Both are extremely effective as
masking inauthenticity. See Bertolin, 40-42.
89 Increasingly, bots are used for political reasons: to inflate the numbers of followers a politician has; to spread propaganda; to subtly influence political
discourse; and to aggregate and broadcast content...” See Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis, “Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online,” (Data &
Society: 2017), 38, 39.
90 Russian IO fuse astroturfing with hybrid-trolling (deliberately provocative behavior that aims to distort online discussions and cause conflict among
participants in order to advance ideological, political, or military objectives). (Bertolin, 29).
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The Weaponization of Social Media: How social media can spark violence and what can be done about it
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