In-depth Case Studies
Case Study 1: Information Operations – Russia’s targeting of the
White Helmet in Syria
In the digital era, coordinated disinformation operations have re-emerged as a central component of
Russia’s information warfare strategy. Modern battlegrounds include areas of the former Soviet Union (such
as Ukraine), but also places like Syria, a country of significant geostrategic importance for Russia that has
been plagued by one of the worst refugee crises in modern history. Russia’s Internet Research Agency
(IRA), cyber-operations divisions and affiliated cyber-mercenary groups have used social media to deceive,
distort and disrupt information environments in targeted contexts. Their modern approaches to hybrid
warfare will increasingly influence conflict in these (and likely other) contexts in the foreseeable future.79
Weaponization via information operations
Information operations —defined as “the integrated employment…of information-related capabilities in
concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of
adversaries”—is a central component of Russia’s Information Warfare strategy.80 In such situations, conflict
is not declared overtly, and most activities are carried out below the threshold of conventional means.
Clashes are “contactless,” using precision capabilities that target non-combatants (i.e., civilian populations,
news media, and/or the private sector).81
Carried out in cyberspace and through social media platforms and networks, psychological operations
(PSY-OPS) influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups or individuals without firing a single shot.82 This has the effect of
denigrating or disrupting critical decision-making capabilities (at multiple levels of societal
governance), and eroding horizontal cohesion between citizen groups, as well as vertical cohesion
between citizens and government through psychological subversion of social institutions and horizontal
linkages, and through the amplification of uncertainty in information ecosystems.83
When information operations are carried out on a systematic basis, they achieve a sort of reflexive control,
or a means of influencing a partner or opponent to take a specific, desired action by conveying specially
prepared information to incline him/her to act voluntarily.84 Targets of Russian information operations have
found their capacity for strategic decision making and collective action crippled.
79 See: Steven Livingston, “Forward” in “Contentious Narratives: Digital Technology and the Attack on Liberal Democratic Norms” Journal of
International Affairs Vol. 71, No. 1.5 (2018) (Link here); Congressional Research Service (CRS), Information Warfare: Issues for Congress (March, 2018);
Sandra Svetoka, “Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare,” (NATO StratCom COE: May 2016); and Edward Lucas and Peter Pomeranzev, “Winning the
Information War: Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe” (CEPA: 2016).
80 CRS, Information Warfare, 3 quoting Joint Chiefs of Staff: 3-13, “Information Operations” (November 27, 2012).
81 Svetoka, 9-11; Lucas and Pomeranzev, 11.
82 CRS, 4). Psychological Objectives: Increase the targets suggestibility, gain control over information environment, create doubt or a sense of
powerlessness, create strong emotional responses to a target, heavy intimidation. See Svetoka, 9.
83 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 12.
84 Lucas and Pomeranzev, 7-8
MERCY CORPS
The Weaponization of Social Media: How social media can spark violence and what can be done about it
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