Susan Benesch’s (2014) Dangerous Speech Guidelines31 include a range of contextual factors and series of hallmarks that collectively estimate the capacity of speech to inspire violence. Dangerousness can be estimated according to the following five factors: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) A powerful speaker with a high degree of influence over an audience most likely to react An audience with grievances and/or fears that the speaker can cultivate A speech act understood by the audience as a call to violence A social or historical context propitious for violence An influential means of dissemination Impacts and implications In Myanmar, both misinformation in the form of organic rumors and speculation, and deliberate disinformation have played a significant role in amplifying grievances and triggering violence between groups of differing ethnic and religious identities. Anti-Muslim sentiment and intercommunal violence against Muslim identity groups have been the most visible examples and are linked to the country’s deep Buddhist nationalist project. Buddhist nationalists such as the 969 movement and Ma Ba Tha have exploited social media (particularly Facebook) “to stoke fear, normalize hateful views and facilitate actors of violence” against identity groups (particularly Muslims, or the ethnic Rohingya) who are perceived and promoted as enemies of Buddhism, or of the State. 32 33 Research has documented narratives of Muslim people (particularly the Rohingya) as illegal immigrants, terrorists and rapists, among other fabricated and incendiary messaging, reflecting the hallmarks of Benesch’s Dangerous Speech.34 , C4ADS documents how virulent rumors and online hate speech triggered the Mandalay riot of July 2014, in which approximately 20 people were injured and two people were killed.35 More recently, the Myanmar military has carried out systematic clearance operations in 2017 against the Rohingya people in response to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacks, another situation that was largely amplified by digital hate speech and the propagation of unverified rumors.36 Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh as a result, with many reports documenting systematic rape by security forces and affiliated militia groups, and over 6,000 civilian deaths. United Nations officials and human-rights organizations have characterized the Rakhine State security operations as ethnic cleansing. 31 Benesch, 2014, 7-8. 32 C4ADS, “Sticks and Stones: Hate Speech Narratives and Facilitators in Myanmar” (2016) 33 Fink writes, “The speakers are highly regarded. The society has struggled with mistrust and violence, and Facebook has become the primary medium of communication. By creating and disseminating images of adversaries through the mass media—and in Myanmar’s case, social media—a group can generate widespread support for the idea that such adversaries cannot remain…” Christina Fink, “Dangerous Speech, Anti-Muslim Violence, and Facebook in Myanmar” in “Contentious Narratives: Digital Technology and the Attack on Liberal Democratic Norms” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 71, No. 1.5 (2018). Fink also points out the emotionally resonant language used, the widespread reach of Facebook, and lack of space and resources for critically accessing information (i.e. weak media institutions). 34 C4ADS, 2016. 35 C4ADS, 11. 36 According to Paladino, “In the wake of the ARSA attacks, the Facebook group for Ma Ba Tha supporters registered a significant spike in anti-Rohingya messages, illustrating the powerful tendency of such online associations to amplify and reinforce the thoughts of its individual members.” (Paladino, 9). MERCY CORPS The Weaponization of Social Media: How social media can spark violence and what can be done about it 13