Case Studies
The following case studies provide snapshots of the contexts in which the weaponization of social media
occurs and the specific tactics used. They are not intended to express opinions about who is “good” or “bad”
in a specific context, but rather outline how social media has been weaponized and the impact of those
activities on peace and stability.
The concepts of misinformation and disinformation appear
through each case study, forming the foundation of how
social media is often weaponized, and are defined as
follows:
Misinformation: incorrect information spread by
people without the intent to deceive6
Disinformation: incorrect information spread to
intentionally deceive or manipulate others7,
including deliberately false news stories,
manufactured protests, doctored content (such as
photos or videos), and tampering with private
communications before release.
Warrap, Sudan | Miguel Samper for Mercy Corps
See Appendix for in-depth case study examinations and findings.
Case Study 1: Information operations — Russia’s targeting of the
White Helmets in Syria
In the digital era, coordinated disinformation operations have re-emerged as a central component of
Russia’s information warfare strategy in places like Syria, a country of significant geostrategic importance for
Russia that has been plagued by one of the worst refugee crises in modern history. Specifically, the Russian
government has made systematic use of information operations to amplify manufactured claims and false
accusations against the Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, a Nobel-prize nominated
humanitarian organization made up of more than 3,000 volunteers who are credited with saving thousands
of lives in Syria.8 In the context of armed conflict in Syria, Russia’s government has labeled the White
Helmets a terrorist organization with links to al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Weaponization via information operations
Information operations — defined as “the integrated employment … of information-related capabilities in
concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of
adversaries” — is a central component of Russia’s Information Warfare strategy.9 In such situations, conflict
is not declared overtly, and most activities are carried out below the threshold of conventional means.
6 Bertolin, Giorgio. “Digital Hydra: Security Implications of False Information Online,” (NATO StratCom COE: May 2016).
https://www.stratcomcoe.org/digital-hydra-security-implications-false-information-online.
7 Misinformation can have a powerful effect on divisiveness and chaos in a target society, as the truth becomes hard to discern. (CRS, 5) Civilians may
knowingly or unknowingly be functioning as proxies on behalf of an adversary (CRS, 1). See also Bertolin, 5.
8 Di Giovanni, Janine. 16 October 2018. “Why Assad and Russia Target the White Helmets.” The New York Review of Books.
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/16/why-assad-and-russia-target-the-white-helmets/
9 CRS, Information Warfare, 3 quoting Joint Chiefs of Staff: 3-13, “Information Operations” (November 27, 2012).
MERCY CORPS
The Weaponization of Social Media: How social media can spark violence and what can be done about it
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