5/22/22, 12:03 AM Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2021 Country Report | Freedom House broad powers to inspect any device on vague bases such as “misuse.” 292 The military has also effectively suspended some of the limited privacy protections afforded in the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, including its modest safeguards against warrantless surveillance and interception of private messages. 293 Recent reports have confirmed the growing scope of the state’s surveillance efforts. A Reuters article from May 2021 described how former military officials had pressured providers in late 2020 to install interception technology that would enable the military to view texts and emails, listen to phone calls, and locate users without assistance or approval. 294 New evidence of government purchases of hacking and extraction technology came to light in March 2021, when budget files obtained by Justice for Myanmar exposed acquisitions amounting to tens of millions of dollars since 2018, including tools from vendors based in Canada, the United States, Sweden, and Israel. 295 These included MacQuisition forensic software, which can extract data from Apple computers; MSAB Field units, which can extract even deleted content from mobile devices; and additional technology that has enabled security forces to determine the home addresses of online critics using their posts and the locations of their internet connections. Earlier reports from 2018 indicated that the government had spent $4.8 million on surveillance technology, 296 which it allocated to the Social Media Monitoring Team (SMMT), 297 a body established under the MoTC following requests from the parliament in February of that year. 298 The government refused to reveal from which country the equipment was purchased, citing security concerns. 299 One telecommunications company had warned that the government was creating a framework for direct interception of user data without proper safeguards. 300 The NLD-led government argued that the SMMT was necessary to counter individuals causing “instability” online, including through hate speech and defamation. 301 Public statements by senior government officials in May 2018 specified that the SMMT’s mandate focused narrowly on foreigners and foreign organizations suspected of causing unrest and threatening the country’s sovereignty through interference. 302 Analysts have suggested that, given Myanmar’s broader political context, the SMMT was established to surveil foreign activists (including activists from Myanmar who operate outside the country or lack citizenship), foreign media outlets, and international organizations that focus on the Rohingya crisis and conflicts involving other ethnic minority groups in Myanmar, as well as the International Criminal Court and other international institutions pushing for accountability for the atrocities against the Rohingya. The SMMT was widely criticized by civil society organizations. 303 Little is known about the body’s operations or whether there is any oversight. 304 Civil society activists suspect that the SMMT is now being used by the military to surveil those opposed to the coup. 305 Since the coup, the police and military have reportedly seized the mobile phones of people they detain, and are thought to use the aforementioned extraction technology on such devices. The authorities are also believed to use drones and security cameras equipped with facial-recognition technology to surveil the public. 306 TOP The confiscation of phones—particularly from human rights defenders, activists, and journalists—also occurred prior to the coup. 307 The police reportedly demanded passwords for social media accounts and other applications from people accused of criminal activity, including in cases where the allegations were unrelated to social media use. 308 For example, shortly after Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2021 23/28