M.MAS 7/22/15 mobilization.45 This process is both cultural and political;46 the motivations of those individuals who themselves participate in riotous violence matter, but so too do the ideologies of a wider swathe of society. Violence is not limited to riots. The narrative of threat described here also serves to justify discriminatory laws, administrative actions, and a demonstrated lack of care for the suffering of a religious Other. A dominant narrative of threat and self-defence also helps to explain the ferocity of backlash against attempts by foreign governments and inter-governmental bodies to promote recognition of citizenship for the Rohingya. Rejecting such calls is, understood in this light, integral to national security; Rakhine State is often referred to as Myanmar’s ‘western gate,’ the front line in a battle to protect Myanmar from an invasion that would make Islam into the dominant religion for Rakhine State and then, eventually, the entire country. Now, they are using the term ‘Rohingya’ and they systematically planned for it and used it since the beginning. They want the Bu Thee Taung / Maung Taw area [townships in northern Rakhine State, near the Bangladesh border] to be under their control. If they get that area, what can happen? They want to cooperate with Bangladesh as they are from the same ethnicity and the same religion. They did it systematically. Most of the people here also think the same way… It is a concern not only for this region but for the whole country… In Myanmar, there are borders on every side; in the north, east, south and west. If one border is broken, it is dangerous for the whole country. The people who will suffer first are the closest ones.47 The feelings of those who have not participated in violence nonetheless help to shape the degree to which violence is ‘thinkable’, and the degree to which individuals, civil society, and the state work for peace. In this regard, the narratives discussed above are also an auspice for indicting or attacking those who do not sufficiently acknowledge or defend against the threat. Such attacks take the form of both personal harassment and public denouncements by other high-profile public figures, as well as shaming campaigns that are becoming increasingly common on social media. Public figures including social activists,48 politicians,49 and government authorities50 that appear sympathetic to Islam are regularly subject to such attacks, as are non-elites in everyday life.51 Journalists, too, have come under fire for covering violence 45 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (University of California Press, 1996); Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. 46 Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 47 Man, 60, Buddhist, Rakhine, Sittwe, March 2015 MSPT 11. 48 After 150 civil society organizations signed a petition opposing a package of ‘race and religion protection’ laws proposed by Ma Ba Tha, they were branded traitors by 969 and Ma Ba Tha leaders and subject to harassment, including death threats. See, Yen Snaing, “Myanmar Activists Face Threats After Opposing Interfaith Marriage Bill,” The Irrawaddy, June 4, 2014, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/activists-face-violent-threats-opposinginterfaith-marriage-bill.html. 49 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is regularly framed as ‘pro-Muslim,’ but other politicians are also subject to attack. In May 2015, for example, a former member of her National League for Democracy party was sentenced to two years for ‘insulting’ religion during a speech in which he criticised hate speech by Buddhist leaders. See, Naw Noreen, “Htin Lin Oo Sentenced to Two Years with Labour,” Democratic Voice of Burma, June 2, 2015, http://www.dvb.no/news/htin-lin-oo-sentenced-to-two-years-with-labour-burma-myanmar/51679. 50 During the research period, for example, a 969-affiliated Facebook account posted the photograph and phone number of a local ward authority who had refused 969 monks permission to hold a public sermon. Screenshots of the shaming campaign are on file with the authors. 51 For examples of the way fear of such attacks prompts people to limit public participation in calls for peace, see Matt Schissler, “May Flowers,” New Mandala, May 17, 2014, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/05/17/may-flowers/. 13