Model Training Materials: Hate Speech, Defamation and National Security As this shows, the connection between speech and an alleged harm to national security cannot be abstract; there must be a sufficient nexus between the two. The Human Rights Committee also specifies that there must be a “direct and immediate connection” between the expression and the alleged national security threat,122 while the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has referred to the “close causal link” between a risk of harm to national security and the expression in question. 123 The actual likelihood that the harm will occur is also relevant to determining whether a sufficiently close connection exists between the speech and the harm. The risk of violence can be assessed by considering the context and nature of the speech in question. The European Court of Human Rights looks to the words used as well as the context in which they were made, including relevant social and political factors, to determine the extent to which speech risks inciting to violence.124 For example, in one case involving a Turkish lawyer who was imprisoned for spreading separatist propaganda, the Grand Chamber acknowledged the insecure security situation in the Kurdish region. However, while the comments in question had been hostile, they did not incite to violence, in particular because they were distributed in a periodical with low circulation, “significantly” reducing their potential impact on national security.125 Human Rights Committee, Kim v. Republic of Korea South Korea convicted a pamphleteer under a provision of its National Security Law which criminalised praising an anti-State organisation or distributing documents which benefit an anti-State organisation. The pamphlets in question called for reunification with North Korea and criticised South Korean policy on North Korea. The Committee indicated that the burden is on the State to demonstrate the precise alleged national security threat. In this case, it found that South Korea had failed to do so. The Committee did not accept that an undefined benefit to North Korea could be sufficient a ground for restricting freedom of expression, noting South Korea had not identified a clear risk to national security. It also noted that there was no indication that any of the courts had evaluated the nature or extent of the alleged risk to national security, or considered whether the pamphlets “had any additional effect” on the readers which would pose a sufficient security threat to render a restriction on freedom of expression necessary.126 General Comment No. 34, note 43, para. 35. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, note 16, Principle 22(5). 124 Sürek v. Turkey (no. 3), 8 July 1999, Application No. 24735/94, para. 40, https://bit.ly/3UJwcHC; and Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey, 8 July 1999, Application Nos. 23927 and 24277/94, para. 61, https://bit.ly/3fTvicW. 125 Okçuoğlu v. Turkey, 8 July 1999, Application No. 24246/94, para. 48, https://bit.ly/3fYmnqu. 126 20 November 1998, Communication No. 574/1994, para. 12.4, https://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/804. 122 123 The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy. 28