trol. Nowhere has this been clearer in the past few years than in Gaza and Sudan, where the destruction of telecommunications infrastructure has cut off millions of people. Since October 2023, Gaza’s telecommunications infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted and destroyed during Israeli military operations, with the entire Gaza Strip, home to more than two million people, plunged into complete blackouts on several occasions. These outages oLen coincided with intensified military operations and bombardments, as well as attacks on journalists journalists, media institutions, and humanitarian workers. Civilian buildings housing internet service providers (ISPs) were among the first to be targeted by Israel, resulting in a sharp drop in connectivity. In October 2023, we gathered data showing how 15 of the 19 providers operating in Gaza faced complete shutdowns of their mobile and broadband services, with internet traffic across Gaza decreasing by over 80% that month. In total, we documented 16 confirmed shutdowns in Gaza in 2023, a further six in 2024, and at least five shutdowns to date in 2025 2025. In the past two years, fiber cables have been severed , network towers have been destroyed , and fuel blockades have thrown into disarray even the most basic communications. Local providers and ISPs such as Paltel and Jawwal have worked against impossible odds to restore minimal service amid bombardments, with several repair workers losing their lives on the job. Desperate civilians, journalists, and aid workers have improvised lifelines, using eSIMs, Israeli and Egyptian SIM cards, and other initiatives to make their voices heard and to maintain family and social links. Amid the ongoing war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan Sudan, internet shutdowns have served a different but equally destructive purpose. Both sides have weaponized internet access, cutting connectivity to tighten control over territories and places where each party has a stronghold, and in a likely effort to obscure human rights atrocities and crimes. Each blackout has sent millions into sudden silence, unable to access banking services, coordinate and deliver aid, or even confirm that their loved ones are safe. The circumstances surrounding these blackouts suggest that they did not result from technical failures. When fighting erupted between the SAF and RSF in Khartoum on April 15, 2023, the SAF immediately ordered telecommunications providers to shut down services nationwide. A second nationwide blackout was imposed just hours before a 72-hour ceasefire went into effect on the night of April 24 — amid claims by the SAF that the RSF had occupied the Sudatel data center in Khartoum, causing a full network outage. As violence surged across Darfur and Khartoum in 2023, entire communities went off grid. The situation escalated further in early February 2024, when the RSF seized control of ISPs in Khartoum, triggering a prolonged internet shutdown that leU two-thirds of the population out of reach for more than a month. That same year, warring parties imposed at least four shutdowns, all of which coincided with grave human rights abuses. In both Gaza and Sudan, patterns of internet shutdowns point to deliberate attempts by warring parties to weaponize internet access as a means and method of warfare. I NTERNET SHUTDOWNS AS A WEAPON OF WAR: A TYPOLOGY OF HARMS Since 2016, Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition’s documentation of internet shutdowns’ serious harms has helped to solidify international consensus that shutdowns are incompatible with human rights. From silencing dissent to providing cover for state brutality and abuse, shutdowns are now widely recognized as a precursor for human rights violations and atrocities, and even as relevant evidence for determining a plan or policy to commit crimes against humanity. In situations of armed conflict, the harms that civilian populations are exposed to during internet shutdowns are more pronounced — and can be fatal. Yet, as mentioned in our introduction, such harms remain overlooked in humanitarian, accountability, and policymaking circles, while the practice of intentionally disrupting civilian connectivity in conflict has been normalized. Internet access continues to be perceived as a “nice-to-have” luxury, rather than something that is increasingly indispensable for the survival of civilians living through humanitarian crises. This report aims to map, as concretely as possible, the tangible ways in which internet shutdowns harm