engagement to maximize economic and political gains. As Felbab-Brown (2017) details, after realizing the economic potential of the jade and gemstone industry, the Tatmadaw took over the highly profitable Hpakant Mine, taking that area away from the KIA which was left merely taxing transport routes from the mines. When the taxed companies, including Chinese, became dissatisfied with the KIA taxation policies, they could mobilize the Tatmadaw, guarding the mine, to suppress and reign in the KIA. The major profits from the mine would accrue to Gen. Than Shwe . . . and his close associates and socalled cronies, key privileged businessmen associated with the junta. (p. 10) This quote shows that uniformity did not exist with respect to the Tatmadaw’s behavior. Policies that have the highest potential to provide the most benefits are the policies that the military enforced. In instances where it was more financially advantageous for the military to hold authority over the mines, ethnic organizations had only taxation as a means of financial livelihood. Control of mines and other land resources became a crucial aspect of the Tatmadaw’s overall domination. As Chinese demands for the extraction industries grew, the military rushed to amend former ceasefire deals in order to maximize their control over such industries so as to reap the maximum benefits possible at the expense of ethnic groups. Ceasefire agreements were used to halt excessive fighting between the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic organizations such as the KIO/KIA, for the purpose of mitigating the severe negative effects that internal conflict had on extraction and transportation of product from such industries. This so-called “ceasefire capitalism” is still important in Burma today and is crucial to the military’s continued chokehold on Burma’s economic affairs. Little international attention was given to the central government’s creation of the Border Guard Force (BGF) following the 2008 constitutional referendum. The Tatmadaw began 75