they had to follow through with promises of a democratic transition. The most effective way to prevent a Tatmadaw retreat from political, social, and economic power was to carry out its BGF plan. In the years following the 2010 general elections and Burma’s “overnight” democratic transition, the military continued its pattern of manipulating ceasefire deals to advance its agenda. In 2015, the central government and military, along with the country’s major armed ethnic groups, agreed on a draft ceasefire deal that would eventually develop into the landmark National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Many Tatmadaw officials and aligned foreign diplomats hoped the NCA would cause ethnic groups to abandon their decades-long fight for autonomy and self-determination (Weng, 2019). The process behind the peace talks and the NCA itself offers insight into the attitudes and behaviors of the military post-democratization. Significantly, in the current political climate it is clear that while the military and executive branches of government often disagree, they find common cause when dealing with ethnic groups and potential insurgents; both would benefit from a longstanding peace in the nation’s border regions. The Tatmadaw and its BGF only stand to expand their influence in border regions if nonstate armed groups participate in a cooperative relationship with the central government. A successful NCA would likely be used by the military as another method of silencing dissent and disseminating their ideology in a way that garners civilian support in regions historically difficult for the military to control. In recent years, multiple ethnic armed organizations have accused the Tatmadaw of breaking the terms of the NCA. Groups including the Karern, Mon, Kachin and 77