continued pattern embedded in the Tatmadaw’s behavior. The initial peace obtained by the early 1990s agreements was centered largely around the black market and proved unsustainable in the long term, exacerbated by pressures from the international community to enforce drug and illicit trafficking laws (Felbab-Brown, 2017). Restructuring of early 1990s ceasefire agreements also served the growing interests of the military-state at the turn of the century. A significant example of the Tatmadaw’s plan to maintain control over Burma’s various export economies is the redesign of ceasefire deals around the jade and gemstone industry. In the late 1990s, international demand for Burmese gemstones was rising quickly, and the political importance of the industry heightened. Control over production became a focal point for the military-state. Hughes (2000) explains that now, under the new Myanmar Gemstone Law, the restructured ceasefire protocols allow for third-party participation in the extraction and dealing of jade and precious gems. Furthermore, not unlike the taxation schemes of the earlier ceasefire deals, the new contracts allow private parties to own and sell products extracted from Burma’s numerous mines in exchange for a tax on exportation, further expanding the industry (Hughes et. al., 2000). The Hpakant Mine in Kachin State provides a clear picture of this issue and is relevant even in “democratic” Burma. It offers a unique insight into the ways the military has historically engaged in specific and highly strategic matters to maintain a course toward its overall goal. The Tatmadaw allowed some smaller private parties to own and sell gem and jade products, and itself engaged in collecting taxes from such parties. However, when mining involved larger operations, the military shifted its methods of 74