ensured that the taxes they collected would remain abundant for the foreseeable future. It should be noted that Burma’s illicit economies—including the drug trade and the illegal timber industry—although not officially taxed, still played an important role in the Tatmadaw’s economic motivations behind ceasefire deals. Individual military commanders as well as military-linked companies were involved in massive landgrabbing campaigns and sought to control essential roads used for the transport of both licit and illicit goods. This division of illegal industry allowed the military to co-opt would-be insurgents, thus further tightening its iron clasp on power. This move was driven primarily by the Tatmadaw’s desire to garner support from regional figureheads rather than harbor any sustainable peace arrangement. Felbab-Brown (20170 goes further to make this claim: The junta incorporated key organized crime figures . . . to come in from the cold and formalize their illicit gains in exchange for their support of the country’s economy and political survival. . . . The illicit and resource economies were thus key to conflict mitigation in the 1990s and for two decades after that. (pp. 8-9) While it is true that illegal industries played a crucial role in the peaceful negotiation of (temporary) ceasefire agreements, one can posit that this was simply a side effect of a greater military scheme aimed primarily at economic and/or political gain rather than genuine interest in regional peace and development. Moreover, this strategy also resulted in the creation of an environment in which it was strategically and economically advantageous for insurgent groups to end fighting and cooperate with military demands. 72