undercut economic profits for the Kachin ethno-nationalists and their businesses, thus reducing their economic incentives for peace in a context they considered economically disadvantageous. (Felbab-Brown, 2017, p.13) It is evident that the Tatmadaw engages in constant shifting of economic and political agreements with Burma’s ethnic organizations any time it becomes unhappy with the existing situation or sees an opportunity to benefit from both legal and illicit economies. Under the existing circumstances, there is no balance of power between the military and the civilian government or ethnic groups; rather, the military continues to holds most of the power (formal and informal), and limits the scope of democratic transition. The military strategically implements economic policies to increase the feelings of vulnerability among the general population, making it easier for the Tatmadaw to control Burmese society unhindered by any significant popular resistance (Skidmore, 2003). In an environment that lacks any public faith in security institutions, where fear of violence penetrates all facets of everyday life, a common response is silence, making it impossible for the population to organize against the regime. Furthermore, as Skidmore (2003) states: Fear is intimately associated with time. As a response to a future possibility, it is inherently temporal. In generating fear, the military confuses, distorts, and controls time with the aim of stopping Burmese people from imagining futures other than one mandating their incorporation not a totalitarian state. (p. 10) A population that cannot envision change will not organize to induce it. In keeping civilians bogged down by fear, the Tatmadaw solidified its dominance with ease. Everything the military does has a strategic role in its overall durability as a dominant figure in Burmese politics and economics. 52