light in order to garner legitimacy and public support. Khin Nyunt proved to be one of the most prominent Tatmadaw leaders during the SLORC and SPDC eras, as Seekins (2011) explains: He was also the face of “new” Burma (“Myanmar”), and the “new” Rangoon, carefully cultivating the image of a reformer and internationalist and playing a principle role in interactions with friendly foreign governments, businessmen, ethnic armed groups that signed cease-fires with the SLORC and (generally pro-regime) scholars who came to Rangoon for government-sponsored academic conferences. (p. 157) The new regime strategically constructed a preferred image in the eyes of the international community and the Burmese public. Despite the country’s history of isolationism up to this point, it was important to top-ranking Tatmadaw and government officials to maintain an identity compatible with international norms. Khin Nyunt’s critical role in the military-state’s plan to maintain control of social, economic, and political sectors did not end with the intelligence apparatus or the new image of Burma that he helped to create. In an attempt reshape Burma’s physical spaces in a way that was conducive to state control and economic profitability, Khin Nyunt introduced his infrastructure program in the late 1990s. Part of this scheme entailed funding the restoration of the famed Shwedagon Pagoda in the heart of downtown Rangoon. However, this push for modernization proved to be a challenge for the military’s cohesion. The military intelligence apparatus Khin Nyunt headed became heavily involved in business activities that contradicted the interests of general Tatmadaw forces. As Khin Nyunt began to gain power due to his involvement in negotiating ceasefire agreements, and with the international community, it became clear to leading SLORC generals that he posed a threat to their individual power. As a result, by September 2004 Khin Nyunt was purged from the regime bureaucracy and MI was 39