The state could not be completely self-sufficient: it needed to extract resources from society to continue in power. . . . Thus, while reserving the power to command in a frequently unpredictable and counterproductive manner (made more intense by Ne Win’s erratic and bad-tempered personality traits), state power-holders also needed the support and cooperation of their inferiors, especially in the economic sphere, where socialist policies had proven ineffective despite repeated talk during the late 1970s and 1980s about market-oriented reform. (p. 103) The behavior of Burma’s socialist government had the hallmarks of the early stages of a scheme initiated to maintain power and supremacy. This is important to remember because it displays the two primary motivations of the Tatmadaw as an institution and of the high-ranking individuals within the Burmese military-state: (1) military longevity, and (2) sustained financial prosperity. These incentives have a long been the driving forces behind nearly all actions taken by Burma’s top echelon and continue to be present today despite claims of democratic change. Those in power rely on their subordinates in order to stay in power, so they partake in coercive measures to garner support. When that does not succeed, the military resorts to outright violence to forcibly control the social atmosphere within which the population functions. Just prior to the 2008 referendum and subsequent “democratic change,” those in power in Burma realized that in order to ensure the survival of the military institution as well as personal prosperity and legal security, they needed to engage with the international community. To do this, it was necessary to present a facade of democracy and human rights reform. While outright military violence against civilians does not occur in Burma today, the same coercive and deceptive measures to control the population and the existence of the Tatmadaw are still being used nationwide. Despite the fact that less than a decade after independence Burma began to adopt socialist tendencies, it preferred to maintain non-aligned partners. The conclusion can be 31