of a pattern of governance that was quickly entrenched under Burma’s successive military juntas. The employment of mass mobilization campaigns to affirm the regime’s legitimacy and image of efficacy rather than to achieve some tangible result. . . . Like the British colonial regime, the Caretaker Government and its junta successors—lacking genuine popular support—depended upon display (in this case, the “egalitarian” spectacle of citizens and soldiers together sweeping away piles of rubbish) to assert its right to rule. (Seekins, 2011, p. 90) It will become apparent later that the same fundamental ideals of discipline and homogeneity, and the strategies used to enforce them, continue to be employed by the Burmese military behind a facade of democracy. The period of the Caretaker Government in Burma also provides examples of the long history of infiltrating social and civil life by the Tatmadaw and top government officials. For example, Ne Win appointed himself chancellor of Rangoon University in an attempt to control the student population and divert political activism. In another instance, an increased military presence in border regions was seen as an attempt at “Burmanization” by ethnic locals but in fact only increased animosity toward the Tatmadaw and the government (Seekins, 2011). During the February 1960 election, Tatmadaw officers attempted to intimidate the public into voting for the pro-military faction of the AFPFL. The idea of a secret ballot was all but ignored as voting was held in open spaces reminiscent of an open voting system. In some instances, military officers were stationed in voting areas with loaded weapons aimed at voters in an attempt to control the outcome of the election. Despite the intimidation tactics used by the military under the Caretaker Government, the 1960 election ended in victory for U Nu and his faction of the AFPFL and democracy was 26